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Correspondence respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations, 1901–1902.

[In continuation of "Africa No. 5 (1901)."]

No. 1.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received June* 20.)

(Telegraphic.) *Camp, Sheikh, June* 20, 1901.

I HAVE just, within a few hours of the mail leaving, received a despatch from Swayne, dated south of Taguras, 13th June.

After reverse of the Mullah at Somala, he pursued the Mullah and his forces to border of Mijjertein country, part of following escaping towards Ilig, the Mullah fleeing, with all his property, to Mudug, enemy losing fifty killed; no casualties reported on our side; our advanced horse pursuing to within a-day and a-half's march from Mudug. The horses were done up, and the pursuit was then abandoned.

All British officers well.

Swayne is proceeding to deal with the Aligheri, towards Bohotele, and prepare for further move against the Mullah, if this is approved.

Swayne reports it is proved Sultan Othman Mahmoud supplied the Mullah with arms, his emissaries escorted Mullah's live-stock to Mudug, and the Sultan has given him asylum there.

According to his present information, Swayne is of opinion that his present force is sufficient to deal with Mullah at Mudug; but, should Mijjertein prove stronger than he anticipates, he proposes to arrange for joint advance with Abyssinian force.

He asks for instructions whether he should move further against Mullah in Italian territory or leave matters alone.

If we now withdraw there will be no finality to the Mullah's movement, and he may at any time return to the Dolbahanta and dominate that province again.

The Mullah has suffered heavily in *morale*, and Sultan Yusuf Ali, at Obbia, is hostile to him.

All things considered, I am of opinion that we cannot leave the Mullah at Mudug, so close to our Protectorate. If he stays there, I would suggest our arranging with the Abyssinians for a concerted move against him, making Mudug our final objective.

Direct communications have been received, dated the 12th June, from Hanbury-Tracy, at Gerlogubi.

Sir Charles Eliot has been informed of the Mullah's flight.

No. 2.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 25, 1901.

AFTER consideration of your telegram of the 20th instant, His Majesty's Government are unable to authorize pursuit of the Mullah into the Italian sphere, and they consider that the military operations should be terminated, subject to any action which may be indispensable in the Aligheri country.

You should convey to Colonel Swayne and his force the congratulations of His Majesty's Government.

It has been suggested that a mobile force should occupy Burao to watch and prevent the invasion of the Dolbahanta country by the Mullah, but the policy of His Majesty's Government not to retain troops in the interior of Somaliland, and, still less, to establish British Administration there, should be borne in mind.

Neither course would appear worth the cost.

His Majesty's Government await your views before finally deciding as to Burao.

You should consult with Swayne on this point.

No. 3.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Camp, Sheikh, July* 4, 1901.

PLEASE see my telegram of the 20th June.

I have received from Gerlogubi, dated the 23rd June, a despatch from Hanbury-Tracy, in which he reports that the Abyssinian force has great difficulty in getting food; he thinks it will soon have to return to Harrar, and says we cannot count on any further co-operation by this force.

Under these circumstances, any question of a move on Mudug is disposed of. Nothing definite is known, but it is probable that the Mullah has moved beyond that place.

If no change occurs in the situation I propose, on Swayne's return from the Alighery country, to disband the majority of the levy, as a temporary preventive measure, retaining a portion, probably at Burao, in intrenched camp. As soon as I see Swayne, I will submit definite proposals on this point.

Does your Lordship approve?

No. 4.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, July* 9, 1901.

YOUR telegram of the 4th July.

You may reduce the levy to such strength as may be considered by yourself and Colonel Swayne to be necessary for present military requirements. Before, however, deciding definitely as to disbanding the majority of the levy and as to the permanent occupation of Burao, I will await your written Report.

No. 5.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 14.)

[Viâ Aden.]

(Telegraphic.) *July* 11, 1901.

MAIL left with my telegram of the 4th July before I received your telegram of the 25th June.

Mullah, fearing an attack by Jusuf Ali, is reported to have moved north-east to Daga Dalola.

I have instructed Colonel Swayne that military operations should now cease. He reports, 2nd July, that after punishing the Alighery, who scattered on his advance, he is now returning.

No. 6.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 28.)

[Viâ Aden.]

(Telegraphic.) *July* 26, 1901.

COLONEL SWAYNE left Bohotele to proceed against force collected near Hassan Ughaz and to attack Mullah, who was reported to be in the vicinity, before I could convey to him the instructions contained in your telegram of the 25th June.

The Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were in considerable force, and severe fighting took place on the 17th. Several of the Mullah's relatives were killed, and his cattle were captured and his huts burnt, while he himself was driven back with heavy loss into the Mijjertein country.

The pursuit was abandoned on reaching the Haud, as the enemy then scattered in every direction.

The expedition is now on its way back to Burao, whence no further movement will be made.

I regret to report that Lieutenant Dickinson was severely wounded in the thigh, and that Captain Friedrichs was killed. He was shot whilst rescuing a wounded non-commissioned officer.

Levy had nine men killed and sixteen wounded; all the wounded are doing well.

No. 7.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August* 2, 1901.

EXPRESS to Colonel Swayne my deep regret for the loss of Captain Friedrichs, and convey to him my satisfaction at his notable successes.

No. 8.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 3.)

[Viâ Aden.]

(Telegraphic.) *August* 1, 1901.

EXPEDITION returned 28th July, all well.

Swayne is with me.

Report regarding occupation of Burao posted this mail.

It is proposed to retain for the present 625 infantry and 100 camel corps, drafting 750 of the levy into Militia, where they will be available at short notice if required. We are reducing the levy to the above strength pending the receipt of orders on these proposals, when any modifications required can be made.

No. 9.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, July* 22, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Captain M. McNeill, commanding the second column of the Somaliland expedition, reporting on the operations at Somala on the 2nd and 3rd June, and copy of two despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. E. Swayne reporting on the operations of the main column from the 1st to the 21st idem.

I had the honour of reporting the result of both sets of operations to your Lordship in my telegrams of the 13th* and 20th ultimo.

I fully concur in what Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne writes in his despatch of the 21st ultimo as to the credit due to Captain McNeill for his able and successful defence of his position at Somala. He had been left in zariba there to guard a large number

* See "Africa No. 5 (1901)," p. 88.

of live-stock captured from the Jama Siad and some prisoners. His force consisted of slightly under 500 men, of whom, including 20 Punjabi Sepoys, 370 were armed with rifles; the rest consisted of tribal spearmen and a few tribal horsemen. He also had one Maxim worked by a Somali detachment under the charge of Lieutenant Younghusband.

He was attacked on the afternoon of the 2nd June by a force of horse and foot men estimated to number 2,000; the enemy advancing most bravely, and getting right up to the zariba, close to which several were shot. The same night a determined attempt was made by the enemy to rush the camel zariba. On the following morning he was attacked by a largely increased force, estimated at 5,000 horse and foot and directed by the Mullah in person, when a determined attack was again made on the camel zariba held by a detachment under Lieutenant Lamprey.

All three attacks were ably and successfully repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. Considering that the hostile force is reported to have had some seventy or eighty rifles, and that besides the main attack a dropping fire was kept up on the zariba till 10 P.M. on the 2nd, it is fortunate that our casualties in the two days' operations did not exceed ten of the levy killed and nine wounded. One of the wounded has since died.

Captain McNeill writes that he is much pleased with the work done by all the British and native officers serving under him, and he particularly mentions Lieutenant Lamprey as deserving of credit for the manner in which he held the camel zariba against two attacks, and brings to notice the good work done by Jemadar Jama Siad, of the old Berbera police force, in keeping the enemy in check whilst the camels were being driven in prior to the first attack.

After leaving Captain McNeill's zariba on the 1st June Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne marched 15 miles east and interposed his main body between the Mullah and the Mahmud Gerad, in order to sever all connection between that tribe and the Mullah's force. On the Mullah's moving back to his head-quarters after his reverses at Somala Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne fell upon his scattered detachments and effectually routed his force; a projected attack on our rear-guard being frustrated. The pursuit was kept up till 1 o'clock that night when the tracks were lost in dense jungle. Thence by a series of rapid marches the Mullah was pursued and driven outside the furthest limits of the Protectorate into the Mijjertein country, one of the advanced parties under Lieutenant O'Neill penetrating as far as latitude 8° 5′, longitude 48° 30′, and another under Ressaldar Musa Farih to within a day and a-half's journey of Mudug.

The horses were done up and the pursuit then ceased. The Mullah with some scattered remnants of his force was presumed to have fled to Mudug, others of his followers having gone in the direction of Ilig. During the pursuit some fifty of the enemy were killed and a number taken prisoners.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne then wrote to ask for instructions as to whether any further proceedings were to be taken against the Mullah in Italian territory, and pending the receipt of instructions proceeded to Bohotele to punish the Aligheri tribe of the Dolbahanta, into whom the Mullah had married and who have been his principal supporters throughout.

On the way a forced march was made and some 3,009 camels and 620 head of cattle were captured from the Rer Hagar and Ararsama tribes, who were implicated in the series of attacks on McNeill's zariba.

It appears, from information subsequently conveyed to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne by prisoners, that at one time, when separated from his column with a few men, he narrowly escaped capture, the enemy being hidden in a ravine 500 yards from where he was inspecting a water supply.

The greatest credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne for the able disposition he made of his force, and the energy and rapidity with which the pursuit of the Mullah was pushed on, the men often marching 25 miles a-day, and on one occasion completing 41 miles with only the water they could carry with them in skins. The result of these operations has been that three determined attacks in force on one of our positions were repelled with severe loss; the forces of the Mullah were completely broken up, and he and the remnants of his force were driven in hot pursuit out of the Protectorate. That the Mullah was not caught appears to be owing to the fact that he did not stand, that he and his horsemen split up into numerous parties, and that but little time was left for pursuit in a most difficult country before nightfall.

I have had the pleasure of communicating to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne the congratulations of His Majesty's Government conveyed to him and the force in your

Lordship's telegram of the 25th June, but I have not yet heard that my communication has reached him.

The question of the further pursuit of the Mullah in Italian territory is decided by the orders received in the same telegram.

It will be observed from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's despatches that he is of opinion that it is proved that Sultan Othman Mahmood, the Sultan of the Mijjertein, is proved to have aided the Mullah in his escape, and that a caravan was seized conveying, amongst other things, three rifles and a quantity of ammunition, in rice bags, on its way from Bosasa to the Mullah. It is difficult to say how far this assistance was rendered by the Sultan and hoy far by the Mijjertein tribesmen on their own account. It is not unlikely that the Sultan sent the Mullah small consignments of arms and ammunition as well as supplies. On the other hand, it is as equally likely that they may have been supplied by individual tribesmen, attracted by the large gains to be made by dealing with the Mullah's camp. I have always held it improbable that the Sultan would join forces with the Mullah; the latter fled south and not towards the northern Mijjertein coast, where Sultan Othman Mahmood now is; and the latest reports from Aden are that the Sultan has refused to afford the Mullah any assistance whatever, and is putting him off with excuses. We know nothing yet for certain, but the probabilities are that he will not afford the Mullah active assistance.

The conditions I propose to make with the Dolbahanta tribes are that they refrain from any further dealings with the Mullah, agree to settle up for caravan and other loots, and cease from further disturbances. On their agreeing to these terms a general anmesty will be proclaimed for all concerned in the late disturbances, except the Mullah and a few of his principal advisers, and the tribes will be allowed to trade with our ports without restriction or the imposition of any punitive tax. The Dolbahanta tribes have been sufficiently punished in life and property. And I am against the imposition of fines which the deputations would doubtless agree to pay willingly enough, but which we could not enforce without further complications. It is my principal object, once the expedition is brought to a close, not to impose any conditions or issue any orders which will involve us in any interference in the Dolbahanta beyond what we can exercise from the coast by pressure, if necessary, on the trade of the tribes. It will, however, be necessary, for order in the Protectorate and in the interests of our Ishak tribes, to keep a portion of the levy temporarily to watch the Dolbahanta. In this connection I shall have the honour of addressing your Lordship in a separate despatch.

In my final report on the expedition I shall have the pleasure of bringing prominently to your Lordship's notice the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne and Captain McNeill.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Eil Maado, South of Togurass,
June 13, 1901.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Mullah Abdilleh Hassan having been pursued into Italian territory, and having quitted the Dolbahanta country for the Mijjertein, I am returning to the vicinity of Bohoteleh with a view to dealing with the Aligheri tribe, and with a view to arranging for more tanks to be forwarded me from my advanced base at Somala, so as to enable me to proceed to Mudug, and thence to dislodge or capture the Mullah. I have not yet received any reports from Captain McNeill as to his action on the 2nd and 3rd June, but have received fairly full information from prisoners captured by me during the pursuit. I gather that the enemy, with whom were the Mullah himself, Sultan Nur, and Haji Sudi, and numbering some 3,000 men, attacked the fortified post held by Captain McNeill at Somala on three successive occasions with considerable dash, the enemy even getting into the camel zariba and killing some of our men there, whilst others attempted to pull away the thorns out of the men's zariba; the latter attempt being frustrated by the wire. The enemy acknowledge 300 killed and a large number wounded. Captain McNeill is to be congratulated on the excellent arrangements made by him and the

happy disposition of his Maxim. On the first night of the attack the flying column, commanded by myself was some 15 miles east of Captain McNeill's zariba (Somala). I had taken this route, after leaving Captain McNeill in security, in order to avoid the defile in the Higolch Pass, and I was making a detour across the open plains to Tifafleh and Las Anod, at which place I succeeded in placing my force between the Mullah and the Mahmud Gerad Dolbahanta. I thought it important to sever his connection with this tribe. In retiring to his head-quarters (Ano Hadigleh), after his successive reverses at Somala, the Mullah's force came through the hills in detachments separated from one another by a considerable interval, and the scouts having given timely warning, the force was able to push between his detachments and complete his discomfiture. The Mullah himself, Haji Sudi, Sultán Nur, and others were with some 500 horsemen, and appeared at first to intend to attack the rear-guard, but on the mounted branches under Major Beynon being brought back from the front to oppose him, and on his being plied with the Maxims, his horsemen broke into groups, and, on being pursued, split up into small parties, attempting to escape by a score of practicable passes over the stoney hills. This occurred about 5 P.M., and I decided to carry the pursuit through the night, splitting up the mounted branches into various detachments, and following up the tracks of the largest party myself with the pick of the horsemen. Three companies of infantry (450 men) were moved up in support, and the transport was zaribaed at the foot of a low hill, protected by two companies. The pursuit was carried on until too dark to see tracks, and was again carried on from 9 P.M. to 1 A.M, when the tracks became lost in dense jungle and scattered in every direction. Having no guides, a halt was made until dawn, when we again proceeded, and eventually reached Weila Hadd which, with Ano Hadigleh, are the Mullah's chief centres. At Weila Hadd some horses were captured and prisoners taken, and the village, large enough to contain 10,000 people, was burnt. Having no guide, and the men and horses having had no water for twenty-six hours, I decided to retrace my steps until the infantry should be met. This occurred about 3 P.M. on the day following the night pursuit. Horses were so fatiged that it was found necessary to leave them behind—they could not, in some cases, even walk. During and previous to the pursuit some fifty of the enemy were killed and some fifty taken prisoners. Forty-five horses were captured and several rifles. The enemy threw away their arms, rifles as well as spears, but the pursuit did not wait to pick many up.

The pursuit being continued, a combined movement of the force was made on Ano Hadigleh, where some more of the enemy's fugitives were killed and horses captured. The tracks hence led eastward, and following them the force reached Kour Gerad and Ben Tagla (about latitude 8° and longitude 48°) on the 12th June. More prisoners were made and horses and camels captured; an important horseman of the Aligheri being killed amongst others.

The enemy had only watered at Ben Tagla, and had then gone south into the Haud. Detachments were sent out in all directions on the night of the 12th and on the 13th, one under Lieutenant O'Neill penetrating eastward to latitude 8° 5′, longitude 48° 30′, and one under Ressaldar Musa Farah (Camel Corps) going south to within a day and a-half of Mudug. It was found that the Dolbahanta allies of the Mullah had gone south-eastward towards Illig, and that the Mullah himself, with all his herds and flocks, had gone due south across the Haud to Mudug, leaving behind camels, bullocks, ponies, &c., and leaving gurgis* standing. Having an insufficient number of water-tins to take me across the Haud here, I find it necessary to relax the pursuit until I can obtain these from Captain McNeill's zariba, towards which I am marching. I hope to receive a sufficient number of tanks, &c., on the way, these being sent to meet me, and to be in a position then to proceed with the punishment of the Aligheri, whilst awaiting your instructions as to whether I should go on into Italian territory at Mudug.

Sultan Othman Mahmud has been proved to have aided the Mullah in his escape. An asylum has been granted the Mullah in Mijjertein territory, and the Sultan himself sent caravans of arms, &c., to the Mullah. Some Mijjertein emissaries have actually escorted the Mullah's cattle to Mudug. Captain Friedrichs succeeded in capturing a caravan proceeding from Bosasa to the Mullah, which had, amongst other things, three rifles and a quantity of ammunition in rice bags. The prisoners corroborate each other, and I am amply satisfied as to the truth of Sultan Othman Mahmud's attitude towards the Mullah.

I have sent letters to the Mahmud Gerad, Berkat Gerad, Sultan Yusuf Ali, and

* Camel cloths used as tents.

Sultan Othman Mahmud, offering n reward for the capture of the fugitive Mullah, and have asked the Berkat and Mahmud Gerad to come into me.

As my pursuit of the Mullah to Illig would probably bring me into collision with Sultan Othman Mahmud, who is an Italian protégé, I consider it incumbent on me, before proceeding across the Haud, to obtain your instructions. My force is, I consider, adequate in the present state of my information, but should it transpire that the Mijjertein forces are stronger than I at present think them to be, I shall, with your approval, concert measures with the Abyssinian force operating west of me between Gerlogubi and Bohoteleh. The Mullah has probably lost all chance of dominating the northern Dolbahanta, but I am not at all satisfied that he may not hereafter return and re-establish his authority with the southern Dolbahanta.

It is a fortunate thing that the Kayat tribe, which most strongly supported him, appears to have suffered the severest losses.

It is not in any case probable that, provided the Protectorate maintains a moderate police force available for immediate action, the Mullah can again disturb the peace of the Ishak country, although, possibly, he may compel the Dolbahanta tribes south of Burdap to fly to us for protection or to accept his domination.

It is a question, having regard to the possible forces which may be developed against us, and also having in mind the extra expense entailed by prolonged operations, whether the force should not leave matters as they are or go on. But, as the Italian territory and protégés would become involved, I think it best to leave this matter to you.

Captain Friedrichs goes in command of some 300 rifles, escorting back over 2,000 captured camels, and will await your reply at Burao.

I shall be glad to get your instructions as soon as possible, and will meanwhile deal with the Aligheri tribe.

All the officers with me are well. I have not, however, heard from Captain McNeill, and cannot therefore say, but Captain Friedrichs will inform you. No opportunities of communicating occurred before this, owing to groups of the enemy's horsemen being on the road.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somaliland Field Force.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Captain McNeill to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Camp, Sumali, June* 17, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to report that I was attacked on the 2nd and 3rd June, 1901, while in zariba at Sumali by a force of the Mullah's men, estimated at 3,000 on the 2nd June and 5,000 on the 3rd. These estimates of numbers were formed on the spot by myself and the three British officers under me, and were subsequently confirmed by what prisoners, captured after the fight, told us. The force under my command numbered just under 500, but of these only about 370 were armed with rifles, the rest being made up of spearmen and a few tribal horsemen. Added to this we had to guard forty-six prisoners, about 3,500 camels, about fifty sheep, goats, and cattle, and about fifty horses. I had also one ·450 Maxim served by Somalis and under command of Lieutenant Younghusband, Bedford Regiment. The men were in a separate zariba from the camels, &c., both zaribas being on a gentle slope facing nearly west, the men's zariba being above, the camel zariba below and under command of view and fire from the men's zariba above. The Maxim was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men's zariba, and commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground on all sides was fairly open, being practically clear of bushes for about 150 yards round both zaribas. The lower or south-west end of the camel zariba is on the edge of a shallow pool of water about 100 yards broad. On the further side of this water some fairly thick bush in patches comes pretty close to the water's edge, and it is to the better cover afforded in this place that I attribute the enemy getting close up to the camel zariba. The second column got into their zariba on the 31st May in the evening. The first column departed south-east about 3 P.M. on the 1st June—the morning of the 1st June being spent by the second column in strengthening and making generally secure both zaribas.

The morning of the 2nd June was also spent in the same way. The attack began about 3·30 P.M., 2nd June.

About that time I saw some horsemen on a low range of hills about a mile to south-east. These men rapidly increased in numbers, and began to descend into the plain and come rapidly towards the zariba. I at once sent to call in the camels. This was well and expeditiously done, only two camels, which broke away, being captured.

The animals were driven into their zariba from both sides. On the north-east side, where the greater number of camels were, they got somewhat crowded in the entrance, and some got frightened and broke back, one lot—a good 150 or so—getting right out into the open plain about 600 yards or so distant. By this time some of the horsemen had got right round to this side, and I began to fear that I would lose at least a portion of the camels. I sent out Jemadar Jama Siad (of the Police) with one section to try and keep off the enemy till, at least, most of the camels had been got in. I supported him by turning the Maxim on to the nearest horsemen. Jama Siad performed his work in a most excellent manner, as he not only kept off the enemy till the camels near the zariba were brought in, but he also advanced well out into the plain and brought in all the camels which had gone out. Some of the horsemen had got right round by now—a good way out—but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range volleys from the Panjabis, we did much to check them. Lieutenant Murray had also gone outside the south side of the zariba with two sections and got all the camels in on that side. Meantime, the enemy had kept pressing on from the south, the horsemen being supported by a large number of infantry, mostly armed with spears, but some had rifles from which they kept up a somewhat irregular fire on the zariba, from which we lost two men and two horses killed and one man wounded. The enemy advanced in the most plucky fashion, but not a man got up to the zariba, though some were shot close to it. By this time it was getting pretty dark, and the attack slackened and finally ceased for a time, though the enemy kept up an irregular fire, which, however, did no further damage. The enemy did not go far back, however, but remained fairly close. They had so far failed in both their objects, *i.e.*, to carry off the camels and to get into the zariba. Just previous to this I sent Lieutenant Lamprey to hold the lower edge of the camel zariba, as I much feared the results of the enemy getting in among the camels. It was very well I did this, as a determined attempt was made soon after dark to rush the north-west corner of the camel zariba. Some of the enemy, assisted by the darkness and the more favourable nature of the ground near here (on the further side of ths water), got right up to the zariba, and were shot down practically touching it—on the outside, however; not a man got inside. At the same time another attack was made on the north-east Maxim corner of the zariba. This was held by the seven men who worked the Maxim and by twenty-two Panjabis. The outside of the zariba was well protected by wire, which considerably delayed the enemy. This and some good shooting by the Panjabis checked this rush also, about ten dead bodies being found round and near this part next morning. No further attack was made during the night, but a dropping fire was kept up by the enemy till about 10 P.M. After this we were left in peace, but the enemy could be heard all night moving about in the bush and calling to each other. They must have carried away a lot of dead and wounded during the night—a pretty good proof of this being that we subsequently found about ten or twelve of their horses dead at various places round the zariba. There were no saddles or bridles on any of them. Our total loss so far was two killed and one wounded.

On the 3rd June, as soon as it was light enough to see, I thoroughly examined all the ground round about and the hills near with a powerful telescope, but could only see about ten horsemen and two foot men to the east. These men were about 3 miles off and going directly away from us; they soon disappeared from sight. About 8·45 A.M. a large and rapidly increasing number of foot men began to issue from the hills to the south. They rapidly extended out till they were in one long line several ranks deep. They advanced straight on us, gradually opening out and enveloping south and south-west sides of men and camel zaribas. At a distance of 1,200 to 1,500 yards out, the line extended from a point behind and to the east of the Maxim gun cairn to a point well out and beyond the broken ground on further side of water at lower (west) end of the camel zariba. They came on at a steady pace, opening out as they came and keeping a good general line. At about 400 yards they opened fire. I should say they must have had seventy or eighty men armed with rifles, and from this fire we suffered several casualties, though luckily most of the bullets went high. I ordered my men to reserve their fire till the enemy were within 500 yards of the zariba. This they did, not a shot being fired till then. We then

opened a heavy fire from both rifles and Maxim, the result of which was that not a man got within 150 yards of the south or east sides of the zariba, though they advanced most pluckily.

Lieutenant Lamprey with some transport and spearmen again held the camel zariba, and here the brunt of the fighting most decidedly fell, as, in fact, it did the previous day.

Aided by the more favourable cover to the west and south-west, the enemy got quite close up to the zariba, about thirty dead being found near this end alone, fifteen of which were dragged out of the water close to the zariba. However, Lieutenant Lamprey and the men under him proved quite equal to holding their own, and, as on the 2nd instant, not a man got into the zariba, though several were killed close up. Two of our spearmen were killed and one wounded by spears in this zariba. This was the only part that was seriously threatened, and to Lieutenant Lamprey I wish to give every credit for the way he held this zariba. Had the enemy succeeded in getting into this zariba it would have been a very serious matter, as they could have collected there under cover of the large number of camels collected in it. They could then have advanced up to attack the lower edge of the men's zariba still under cover of the camels till quite close up, and even if they had not succeeded in getting into the upper zariba they would almost to a certainty have been able to let out all the camels from the lower end. After this rush was stopped the enemy retreated, nor did they renew the attack. Our total loss for the two days' fighting was nine killed and nine wounded (one wounded since dead). We actually found 180 enemy dead round the zariba, and took 5 prisoners. I estimate the enemy's total loss at 500 killed and wounded for these reasons: 180 dead actually counted on the actual scene of fighting, and I am practically sure that at least 20 dead have never been found, having got away wounded and died some distance out. This makes 200 dead. Now, if it is taken into consideration that the enemy were all round us (as we know they were) on the night of the 2nd June, it is clear they must have carried off a large number of dead and wounded, and if we further reckon 2 men killed out of 5 hit—in my opinion a liberal allowance—the numbers of the enemy killed and wounded should be 200 killed and 300 killed and wounded, including all carried away on the night of the 2nd instant.

In conclusion, I wish to state that I was particularly pleased with the work of all the British and native officers of the column under me; they all did their work in a manner that left nothing to be desired.

Names of British officers, 2nd column :—

Captain M. McNeill, Argyll and Southern Highlanders;
Lieutenant L. Murray, East Surrey Regiment;
Lieutenant Lamprey, Royal Dublin Fusiliers;
Lieutenant Younghusband, Bedford Regiment.

Native officers :—

Jemadar Mahomed Yusuf, H.A. Abdurrahman;
Jemadar Jama Siad, H.T. Abdi Mahomed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MALCOLM McNEILL, *Captain,*
Commanding 2nd Column, Somali Field Force.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Bohotele, 45 miles south of El Dab, June 21, 1901.*

I REGRET no opportunities occurred until now to keep you informed of my movements, the enemy's horsemen having been between my force and Captain McNeill's zariba in bodies numbering forty and fifty men; I did not feel justified in sending small parties of men back with the mails, fearing that rifles might fall into the hands of the enemy, and I could not induce spearmen to undertake the risk.

I had the honour to inform you shortly, in a letter written from camp Eyl Mado, near Beretable, of the events up to date of writing. Since then, having satisfied myself that the Mullah had actually escaped to the Mijjertein, with the collusion of the Mijjertein people, and seeing I had to make provision for more water than the tanks I had at

Beretable allowed of my taking, I decided to effect a juncture with Captain McNeill at Lasadar, south of Somala, and then receive from him the necessary tins to enable me to proceed, if necessary, across the Haud to Mudug in pursuit of the Mullah.

I had the honour to inform you shortly of the events at Captain McNeill's zariba, and I further directed Captain McNeill to furnish you with details. I now inclose a list of our casualties, and am happy to say no British officers were hurt. The enemy appear to have advanced on two days, and have made a third abortive attempt.

On the first day (2nd June) the horsemen, having been checked by Maxim fire, failed to prevent the camels being rounded up, and on their renewing the attack were repulsed by rifle fire.

On the second day (3rd June) the attack was much heavier, and I am surprised that the enemy, being composed of so many men who served the Mullah only from compulsion, should have advanced in the face of fire so steadily, and should so long have persisted in renewing his attempt to reach the zariba.

Although the enemy's advance was unable to continue up to less than 150 yards of the men's zariba, they got very close to the picquet in the camel zariba, and hand-to-hand fighting occurred for some ten minutes, stones and spears being thrown in. Lieutenant Lamprey, in command at this point, deserves great credit for his defence. The enemy even advanced over the lake, and fifteen dead bodies were afterwards recovered from it. The last attempt occurred in the dark at 9 P.M. The Mullah appears to have finally withdrawn his force at midday on the 3rd, and when he found his way barred by my force at about 4 P.M. on the 4th he had already covered some 40 miles. He was then, as I had the honour of informing you, continually pursued for another 120 miles, leaving many wounded prisoners on the road, and constantly losing men from the rifle fire of our patrols and scouts. Some fifty horses fell into our hands, and the pursuit was not discontinued until the Camel Corps scouts had located his position within a day and a-half's march of Mudug, well into Italian territory, and he was still marching on. Laden camels, gurgis, and articles of all kinds were scattered along the road. The force marched frequently over 25 miles a-day, and on one occasion covered 34 miles in twenty-one hours. On one occasion 41 miles were covered by the men on only the allowance of water they were able to carry in the skins themselves.

A juncture with Captain McNeill's detachment was effected 15 miles south of Somala without incident at Lasader, the road back from Beretable being marked by the bodies of men wounded at the zariba and who had died on the road. I have no doubt that Captain McNeill's estimate of casualties is fairly correct, and that, including the losses inflicted on the Mullah by them, he cannot have lost less than 600 men killed and wounded. The Khayat, Aden Madoba, Ali Gheri, Jama Siad, Nur Ahmed, and Mijjertein were all implicated in the attack on the zariba, as was evidenced by the bodies of men actually shot and by wounded men found on the road. The enemy's rifle fire was better than I expected it would be, when it is considered that out of a total of some 400 or 500 shots fired by them at 400 or 500 yards, twenty-one casualties were inflicted upon the garrison (including the two horses killed), say, 6 per cent.

On the 19th June, by making forced marches, the Rer Hagar karias implicated in the assault on the zariba were surprised at Jillib, and further karias of the Rer Hagar and Ararsama were attacked at dawn on the 20th June some 20 miles further on. Over 3,000 camels, 20,000 sheep, and 620 cattle were captured; the sheep were all given back to the women who remained behind with the karias. The camels, &c., are for the most part being sent up to Burao in charge of the Habr Toljaala. As the enemy, after the first alarm which reached them an hour before the force arrived, fled with their animals in every direction, our men told off for the duty necessarily became much split up in the pursuit, and, consequently, frequently found themselves opposed by the enemy's fighting men, with the result that some loss in men was also inflicted on the enemy.

The effect of these sudden seizures and attacks on the Jama Siad and Rer Hagar, both of which tribes were concerned in the attack on our troops, and who still have some members with the Mullah, has been to intimidate them. Ergos have come in from both these tribes, as also from the Nur Ahmed; and the Berkat have expressed their willingness to come in.

The conditions the tribes seem likely to agree to are:—

1. To cease from all dealings with the Mullah and to cut themselves adrift from those individuals still with him.
2. To compensate the Ishak tribe for losses.
3. To send me horsemen to assist in the care of captured live-stock.

4. To send their karias northward to the vicinity of the Ishak tribes in order to furnish a guarantee for good behaviour.

5. To acknowledge their culpability and due punishment.

6. To pay a fine.

Owing to our rapid movements the tribes have as yet had no opportunity for sending their horsemen to us, but I have no doubt some will arrive in due course.

It now remains to compel the Ali Gheri to come to terms. Some loss in men has already been inflicted on them, and I have hopes of compelling a settlement within the next week or ten days. When this is done the objects of the first phase of the expedition will, I hope, have been attained, viz.:—

(1.) To break up the Mullah's force and drive the remnants out of the British Protectorate;

(2.) To compel the tribes to enter into agreements with us assuring their good conduct in the future and closing the Dolbahanta country to the Mullah should he ever return.

As regards the second phase, the decision whether it should be proceeded with or not rests with you. I had the honour to put the case before you in my letter from Eyl Mado, and I have nothing to add, except that the complicity of the Mijjertein has been further brought out by the evidence of prisoners subsequently taken. The Abyssinians are not here, but the Ebrain appear to have fled to the Ali Gheri, south of Kurmiss (about 35 miles south of this), in fear of the advancing Abyssinians. I am trying to obtain touch of the latter. All officers of the force are well, and the percentage of sickness amongst the men is very small. My horses are, however, quite knocked up and require careful nursing.

Captain Merewether proceeds to Burao with 100 spearmen, 100 infantry, and 15 mounted infantry, escorting the captured camels, and he will remain at your disposal should you need him; but he would, of course, like to come down again should you sanction further measures against the Mullah.

I am writing to Captain Sharp to join me with a convoy from Burao, and the medical officer is writing to the hospital assistant to come down.

The Mullah is said to have now gradually got in stragglers amounting to some 2,000 men, chiefly of the Rer Hagar, Adan Madoba, Jama Siad, Ali Gheri, Khayat, Hawiya, Adone, and Mijjertein. Their spirit, however, appears broken and many are deserting with horses and loot.

The force has sufficient food for thirty days, and food being obtainable locally will in any case require no more. We can now carry from four to five days' water, extra skins having been made up from the sheep slaughtered for rations. Owing to good grazing the Camel Corps have, without any harm resulting to their condition, been reduced to half rationr, tbus prolonging the period for which they can be rationed, and I do not anticipate running short seriously unless grazing dries up. The rain pools on the road to Burao are all drying up, but I anticipate difficulty only for the horses and live-stock.

As representatives of the Jama Siad and Nur Ahmed had come in to tender submission, and as the first batch of camels had already been taken north by the Habr Yunis spearmen, I considered it unnecessary to send back Captain Friedrichs to deal with the Mahmud Gerad. The instructions should therefore be cancelled. At the same time it would be, perhaps, well to bear in mind the question of the advisability of a subsequent demonstration, on the return of the force, into the Rer Benin country.

We afterwards heard, and the news is confirmed, that on the night preceding the first attack on Captain McNeill, the enemy, whose horsemen the flying column had chased during the day (eight men were captured) surrounded the column at 300 yards distance in bushes and trees, and orders were given by the Mullah that on his giving the cry of the jackal as a signal a general rush should be made, every man dragging away a bush from the zariba, and then selecting his own man to kill. I am confident the wire would have frustrated this plan had it been carried out. As a matter of fact the enemy did not attack, as Sultan Nur advised the Mullah that 1,000 rifles defended the zariba of the first column, whereas there was only 100 sick men in McNeill's zariba, and hampered by all the seized camels of the Jama Siad. In this Sultan Nur was mistaken, as I had left 320 rifles in the zariba, including the twenty Panjabis and a Maxim. I was quite aware that the zariba would probably be attacked, and therefore put it in a thorough state of security, and was in no anxiety as to the men, though I recognized it might be possible and easy to stampede the camels. I calculated that the seizure of the Jama Siad camels would compel the Mullah to take the initiative or else lose the Jama Siad, and all his prestige would follow. This was, as I stated at Burao,

my intention. It is interesting to note that whilst engaged with a few men some 2 miles on the right flank of the flying column in inspecting Yaghori water, the enemy was concealed in a nullah some 500 yards off, and prisoners afterwards caught informed us that we were seen, and nearly captured.

The Rer Hagar have just come in in accordance with their promise. Spies have located the Ali Gheri at Kurmis, and scouts have captured some prisoners and camels near here. A batch of spies who went out in the night are due back shortly. I am keeping the Rer Hagar and Ararsama with me until Captain Merewether and the seized get clear off from here. I do not anticipate, therefore, that he will have any trouble on the road.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somali Field Force.

P.S.—In readverting to the credit I consider due to Captain McNeill, I would like to add that from subsequent inquiry I am of opinion that no officer could have done better, and few as well. Captain McNeill speaks highly of Lieutenant Murray and Lieutenant Younghusband, and specially mentions Lieutenant Lamprey as having saved the camels. Although the camels in themselves are unimportant to us, it should be remembered that the tribes attach great importance to them, and had they been recovered by them, our prestige would have been samewhat shaken.

E. J. E. S.

No. 10.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, July 23, 1901.*

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, dated the 8th July, from Bohotele, in which he reports that he was about to leave for the Eastern Dolbahanta to deal with a body of the Mullah's late supporters, who had collected in force at Beretable and were looting on their own account, and subsequently to again attack the Mullah should he remain in the locality he was reported to be in about 50 miles south of that place.

I presume Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne had strong reasons for making this move without awaiting the further instructions he had asked for.

Beretable is situated near Hassan Ughaz, in the extreme south-east limit of the Protectorate near the junction of latitude 8° and longitude 48°.

The instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June reached me on the 5th July. The same day a despatch was sent communicating these instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. My despatch, however, did not reach Bohotele; the Sowars conveying it and other letters were met between Burao and Bohatele by Lieutenant Murray, who gave the despatch to six men of the Ararsama with instructions to follow up the column, which had already left Bohotele for Yahelle as rapidly as possible.

A further despatch, repeating your Lordship's instructions and desiring Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to return immediately on its receipt, was sent after him as soon as I received his despatch, now inclosed, and this left Burao with a party of thirty of the Camel Corps on the 13th. Again, another despatch was sent by Captain Bruce, who proceeded from Burao two days later to join the column at Yahelle with the remainder of the Camel Corps and some Mounted Infantry under Captain Merewether.

One or other of these despatches must have reached Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne ere this; but so far I have not heard from him. I am daily expecting messengers.

The question of future requirements will be dealt with on Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's return. It will probably be held by His Majesty's Government that Ainaba is too far an advanced post to hold, more especially as there is no question either of administering that part of the country or of retaining troops in the interior of Somaliland longer than is absolutely necessary. Such at present is my view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Bohotele, July* 8, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to report my return here this morning from the south, when I received your letter asking me to let you know exactly where the Mullah now is and what numbers of men he has.

As regards this question I am afraid it is impossible, relying, as I have to, on information received from unwilling prisoners, to give accurate information, and of course a day may alter anything I may say; for the Mullah never remains long in one place and his men come and go. It appears that the Mullah is now at a place some two days' journey, say, 50 miles south of Beretable in the Haud. He left Mudug on Sultau Yusuf Ali's threatening to bring a force against him, and went to his present position into the densest of thorn jungle, hoping there to be able to stave off our attack. He is reported to have only some 500 men now with him, men having steadily deserted with horses and arms and loot. At Beretable, however, are a considerable number of his recent supporters, now deserted from him and raiding on their own account. They are reported to possess 300 rifles and some 1,500 spearmen, and to have 100 horses and all the Mullah's cattle. The Mijjertein Sultan is said recently to have sent another forty camel loads of stores and guns to the Mullah.

As regards the Abyssinians, I tried to get in touch but failed. My people reached to within a short distance of Gerlogubi but could not find them, and the Sultan of the Ibrahim, who was taken prisoner and since released by me, reported he had gone to Gerlogubi, and the Abyssinians had gone south to the Rer Abdilleh country. So that co-operation just now is out of the question, but I hope to succeed in gaining touch by letter later on. I have no doubt that the Mullah's road to the southern Ogaden can be blocked. He could take one of three courses:—

1. Seek an asylum northward towards Bosasa and take boat there.
2. Proceed south to the Hawiya.
3. Stay where he is until this force had returned, and then come back to Yaheyl.

Of these the first is the most probable, for he would never feel safe in the Hawiya country so close to Yusuf Ali, and he would not dare to go to Gerlogubi owing to the Abyssinians. Also I intend now, if he still remains south of Beretable, to attack him where he is directly my jowari camels return to me, and after disposing of the force at Beretableh. To do this I am obliged, owing to grazing and water requirements, to go to Yaheyl first, and I shall move forward from there probably about the 13th instant, but of course this depends on the information which I then receive. Information changes every day.

As regards the work done by the expedition during the last week, we have subdued the Aligheri and inflicted a loss of some fifty to sixty men and some 6,000 camels. The Aligheri Elders are coming in, and some twenty-five of them are now being sent north to Berber. They agree to make restitution for all loots. The Ibrahim also came in, and the Sultan has gone back to bring in his Elders. He also and his men agree to all my terms. Some 1,520 camels belonging to his tribe, and taken by us whilst pursuing the Aligheri (they were mixed up together), he has agreed to hand over to me as an earnest of his wish to return my loot. He and the Aligheri acknowledge their complicity in the attack on McNeill's zariba and in raids against the Habr Yunis and Samanter Abdalla and Abdi Barreh. The troops and transport covered steadily some 30 miles a-day, and worked very hard over an area of some 1,600 square miles, and I think the Aligheri now realize that even in the excessively dense bush, where they had managed to hide themselves, they are not safe from punishment. Some ten Hajis were killed in the attack on McNeill's zariba and afterwards, by the first column. Their names are all noted. A number of the Mullah's horsemen coming from Mudug to spy on us at Kurmiss were shot by our scouts and their horses and arms taken. Some more rifles and ammunition were captured. Owing to our holding Bohotele, Kurmiss, Heygaleh, and Kasserah water simultaneously, great pressure was brought to bear on the tribes, who were unable to water their cattle, &c., and this pressure eventually resulted in some fifty karias coming in and submitting unconditionally. These are being followed by the whole of the Aligheri.

On my return to Bohotele I found twenty-six horsemen of the Jama Siad and one of the Nur Ahmed had come in, as also an Ergo of the Berkad Gerad.

As regards future requirements I do not think Burao suitable, but would make a

bid to hold all Dolbahanta with 160 rifles at Ainabba. A post impregnable to spearmen could easily be made and would be sufficiently strong to keep the Mullah out, as the tribes with this protection would not return to the Mullah. At the same time, the expedition has shown me that Mait and Shelau should become Customs stations, the trade of other roadsteads being diverted to these places or to Berbera, and the Italians should administer Bender Casem (Bosasa). The northern Dolbahanta could then be kept in order and the increasing importation of rifles could be checked.

I am sending down some 200 prisoners captured in our operations, many of whom were in the attack on Mc'Neill's zariba. I released 150 others. I would suggest their being detained in Berbera until the end of the expedition, when a certain number against whom the heavier crimes could not be proved should be liberated. However, their ultimate disposal does not lie in my province, but rests, of course, with you. I am sending Lieutenant Murray back in charge of a batch of camels, which I have arranged with the tribes to take charge of. The batches sent up to Burao so far have been 1,800, 2,930, 623, and 1,560 cattle, and the present batch should number about 7,000 and 100 cattle or over, making altogether some 13,000 odd camels and 723 cows. The troops cannot take charge of all these, as if they did I would have no men left for operations. I have made satisfactory arrangements, therefore, with the tribes. As I am writing under great difficulties as regards wind and dust, I trust that you will overlook the untidiness of this report.

All are well except Lieutenant Lamprey, who has had dysentery, and who will, therefore, now go back to Burao.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somaliland Field Force.

No. 11.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 9.)

My Lord, *Camp, Sheikh, July 26, 1901.*

I HAVE the honour to submit copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, dated Cour Gerad, the 18th instant, describing the operations reported in my telegram of this day's date. This despatch reached during the night of the 24th instant.

Another severe defeat has been inflicted on the Mullah and his followers by the native levies commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. The Mullah's karia has been burnt, his cattle captured, several of his relatives killed, and he and his force have been again driven back into the Mijjertein country with heavy loss, and scattered in every direction. Pursuit was carried on till it was useless to proceed further.

It is, however, an ominous fact that the Mullah was able to concentrate again so soon after his series of reverses in the course of the preceding month; this fact will have to be taken into consideration in connection with the proposals I hope shortly to do myself the honour of submitting with regard to the proposed post at Burao. The expedition should be back at that place about the 28th instant, and it will not again move from there.

I shall probably receive a further report from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne giving details of these operations, which are missing in his present despatch. This was written in pencil, and was evidently drafted after a heavy day's work.

The strength of the force Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne attacked is not stated, but it is reported that the Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were present in considerable numbers. This shows that he has succeeded in enlisting the aid of the Mijjertein tribes, hostile to Yusuf Ali, on the eastern borders of the Dolbahanta, and it is to the rifle fire of these men that our casualties are principally due.

I regret to have to report that Captain Friedrichs, R.E., was killed in these operations. In him the service loses a valuable and experienced officer. He met his death in the performance of a gallant action.

Our other casualties were Lieutenant Dickinson, severe flesh wound in the middle of left thigh, and nine of the levy killed, and sixteen wounded. No other British officers were hurt, and the wounded are all reported to be doing well.

I do not quite understand Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's allusions to my despatches to him. The first that reached him was evidently the despatch I wrote on the 5th July,

informing him of the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June. In the second I wrote that if he had not already left Bohotele to return to Burao he should now do so; and with regard to the Nogal Valley, I said that no operations should now be undertaken there or elsewhere. I can, however, quite understand that when Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came up with the Mullah's rear-guard at Cour Girad he felt himself bound to go on. He could not have done otherwise.

It will be observed that Mahmud Girad, the powerful tribe occupying the northern Dolbahanta, joined the expedition, but would not face the Mullah's rifles. This is typical of the situation throughout; the tribes are powerless against the Mullah's rifles.

The Mullah has now twice been attacked and routed with heavy loss. In each case he has made good his escape. This only emphasizes the extreme difficulty of catching an individual who has a large area to fall back on in a very difficult country interspersed with dense thorn bush; were he to stand it would be different; but his plan is to keep well out of the fighting line, and bolt as soon as he sees that all chance of success is up.

I would invite your Lordship's attention to the fact that, in the course of nine days, this column, self-contained in every way, and operating at a distance from its most advanced base, had made a march of considerably over 100 miles, fought a successful action, and pursued the enemy to a distance in the Haud,

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Cour Gerad, near Beretableh, July* 18, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mullah Abdilla Hassan, having received no encouragement from Sultan Yusuf Ali, of Obia, considered his position at Mudug insecure, and therefore attempted to come north-westward to Kurmiss. It was then that his mounted scouts found the road blocked at Kurmiss and Heygaleh by our people, and a certain number of them were killed. The result was that the Mullah changed his plans and came north again to Weyla Hedd, with a view to proceed to Firdiddin, about 16 miles south-east of Beretableh, within the British border. His horsemen were sent down to Eyl Maado and Beretableh.

On getting this news I moved my force from Bohotele viâ Yaheyl and Weyla Hedd to Firdiddin, and attacked the Mullah at the latter place, latitude 8° north, longitude 48° 10′, shortly after dawn on the 17th instant. The Mullah's Mijjertein riflemen were in considerable strength with Lebel and Martini-Henry rifles. His force was, however, scattered, and he himself was driven back into Italian territory. The Mijjertein lost heavily, and also the Mullah's own family. His brother-in-law, Gaibdeed, was killed, as well as two sons-in-law, Haji Sudi's brother and nephews, &c. Sultan Nur's camels and the Mullah's cattle were captured. The pursuit was carried on into the bush in the Haud, and then, as the enemy had scattered in all directions it was discontinued. The Mullah's own karia was burnt, with all his books, &c. I regret that the action cost us 5 per cent. casualties in the whole force engaged, viz., ten killed and seventeen wounded, thirteen riding camels killed missing, and twenty-one ponies.

I am grieved to state that amongst the killed is Captain Friedrichs, R.E.' He was shot whilst trying to convey to a place of safety a wounded Somali Havildar. He was buried in camp, all officers being present.

Amongst the wounded is Lieutenant Dickinson, D.C.L.I., gun-shot wound through the muscle of the left thigh. Lieutenant Dickinson received this wound whilst leading his men over a rocky plateau against the enemy's riflemen on a commanding hill. His action in clearing the hill was most timely, and owing to this and the support of the 1st Corps under Captain Phillips on the right flank our casualties were fewer than they otherwise would have been.

The 2nd Corps, under Captain McNeill, operated on the left flank, and carried on the pursuit when the enemy began to give way.

All wounded are doing well. No other British officers were hurt.

I received your communication, stating that it was not intended I should proceed to

the Mijjertein country whilst I was on the march at Yaheyl and the Mullah's scouts were in front of me. Your second letter informing me that it would not be advisable to move down the Nogal reached me at Cour Gerad, when I had caught up the Mullah's rear-guard, and I was compelled to go on for water. I complied with your wishes that I should return immediately I had driven the Mullah across the frontier, and returned the same day to Cour Gerad, covering some 35 to 40 miles on the 17th instant. To-day I move to Eyl Maado for water, and thence proceed towards the coast viâ Tifafleh–Ainabba–Burao.

The Nahmud Gerad horsemen joined the expedition and looted the Mullah's camels after we had broken his resistance. They would not, however, face his rifles. I fear that our sudden return to the coast will encourage the Mullah at a time when our continued pursuit would have resulted in his eventual capture. The tribes cannot withstand him, and as he has now a number of Mijjertein riflemen with him, swelling the number of his rifles to some 600 or so, he will, I have no doubt, overrun the Dolbahanta country after my return.

As regards Burao, I think your suggestion to keep 250 men will meet the case, but there should be some 600 or 700 militia available for emergencies.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Somaliland Field Force.*

P.S.—I am deeply grieved at Captain Friedrichs' death. He was a very clever officer, hard working and keen, and his death was a plucky one.

E. J. E. S.

No. 12.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 17.)

(Telegraphic.) *August* 15, 1901.

MULLAH reported to be inactive on border of Mijjertein country where he was driven last month. Colonel Swayne, on behalf of the force, tenders his respectful thanks to your Lordship for your kind congratulations.

No. 13.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received August 19.)

(Extract.) *Camp, Sheikh, August* 1, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to submit proposals for the temporary occupation of Burao, and the location there of a movable force to watch the Dolbahanta, and prevent invasion by the Mullah Muhammad-bin-Abdullah.

Annexed are two despatches from Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne. That written on the 26th ultimo is supplementary to his despatch of the 18th idem reporting on the operations at Beretable. In that of the 31st ultimo he records his views on the situation in the eastern province and on its border as left after those operations, and notes the strength of the force he considers it necessary now to retain at Burao. The expedition returned to Burao on the 28th July, and Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne came on at once here, and is now in my camp. I have had several conversations with him on the situation, and I am quite in accord with him as to the measures we should now take in connection with the location of a force at Burao and the strength at which it should, for the present, be maintained. These proposals are framed with the object of insuring a sufficient safeguard without incurring more expenditure than is absolutely necessary, in view of a possible state of affairs which will be fraught with considerable danger to the Ishak tribes and the nearer portion of the Protectorate. We cannot yet predict what the results of the series of reverses the Mullah has sustained will be, but he has the whole of the Dolbahanta again open to him, and we must be prepared to repel any attack from that quarter, and protect our Ishak tribes from further molestation by the Mullah's raids.

It is interesting to note that after twice traversing the whole breadth of the Dolbahanta, and after our expedition has thrice encountered the Mullah's forces and routed them, the facts recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne in the two inclosures to

this despatch fully bear out the opinions I have expressed to your Lordship from time to time as to the character of this movement, the absence of any hostility to the Administration on the part of the Dolbahanta *per se*, the defenceless position of the tribes in the face of the Mullah's riflemen, and the great danger, and still further danger to be apprehended, from the influx of arms from without among a savage population hostile to civilization.

After the Mullah's defeat and rout in June I was of opinion that 250 infantry and 100 Camel Corps would be a sufficient force to maintain at Burao with a militia reserve. The fact that the Mullah was able to concentrate so soon after his defeat, and that he was only routed again after some severe fighting in which we lost one British officer killed and one wounded, besides nine of levy killed and sixteen wounded, has caused me to modify my views. Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, too, is no longer of opinion, in the face of a possible advance of the Mullah, that we control and administer the Dolbahanta with the small force stationed at Ainaba, suggested in his despatch of the 8th July.

The Dolbahanta have no wish to be inimical to us, but, if the Mullah returns and again dominates their country, they will be forced to be so. They have all submitted to us. Now they will naturally ask, "If the Mullah attacks us, will you defend us?" This will be a somewhat awkward question. It is evident we could, under no circumstances, undertake to send an expedition to the far end of the Dolbahanta every time the Mullah threatened the border. The Dolbahanta have now come in to us because they found us in strength in their country. They are a turbulent race, always fighting and raiding among themselves, and until this expedition entered their country we have interfered but little with them, and never attempted to administer the country. Writing last year in June, I pointed out that it would not be worth the expense to do so. Nor are we under the same obligations to defend them from the Mullah they themselves created, supported, and followed, as we are to protect the Ishak tribes who, at first attracted partly by the Mullah's movement, eventually resisted it, and, finally, actively joined us to suppress it, and secure them from further molestation by the Mullah, now imbued with fanatical hatred towards them.

I take it from the instructions received in your Lordship's telegram of the 25th June that His Majesty's Government would not be prepared to incur the increased expenditure which would be entailed by holding the Dolbahanta, where a small force would be constantly exposed to risk. We must, therefore, leave the Dolbahanta alone, and confine our attention to watching that country and safeguarding against attack on our ports and the nearer portions of the Protectorate which may be threatened by any further move on the Mullah's part.

By retaining 500 infantry and 100 Camel Corps at Burao, a reserve company at Berbera, and providing for the rest of the infantry being formed into a militia, we shall have a movable force available, which can be brought up to the strength of the present levy in case of emergency at very short notice. The permanent transport and 100 ponies will be retained and grazed near Burao. The 150 mounted infantry will be disbanded. There was always difficulty in getting the tribes to supply mounted men, and it is not now thought worth while to proceed further with the scheme for forming a militia of this branch. Our 100 ponies will be available to mount the same number of infantry in support of the Camel Corps.

It must be remembered that the men of the levy merely enlisted for the operations which have now terminated. They are anxious to go, at least for a time, to their homes. Of the four companies retained at Burao it will be necessary to let half the men go on a month's leave, the others following on their return, on the understanding that they rejoin immediately if required to do so. In the meanwhile, I propose to retain the fifty Punjabi Sepoys from India until we can arrange to obtain the party of Punjabi Mahommedans for which provision has already been made in the estimates. The Punjabis now here are on the active lists of their regiments, and have only been seconded for six months.

For the present we shall require to retain two Captains and seven Lieutenants. The remaining British officers can be allowed to return to their regiments.

The question of the issue of arms to our tribes is one I have always been loth to approach, but I concur with Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne that some measure of the kind has become necessary as regards the eastern Habr Yunis, and it will be remembered that the issue of a limited number of old Sniders to the western tribes was forced upon me last year as the only possible means of affording the tribes protection in their grazing grounds. No case of the misuse of these arms has occurred once those given to the Aida Galla were taken back. Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne is right that these raids are so sudden that they would be over before any assistance could be afforded from Burao, or

elsewhere; and it is desirable, for several reasons, that the Camel Corps should be retained as a compact corps, and not split up into numberless small parties scattered all over the distant grazing grounds out of ready touch with Burao. The suggestion to arm portion of the militia with Sniders and allow them to remain with the karias till required for an emergency or for training is probably the best solution of the difficulty. The men are trained to arms, and we shall have a certain amount of control over them. In any case of misuse of these arms all with the particular tribe or section would be recalled, and there would be a powerful incentive not to misuse them. They would not be allowed to be taken across our border, so complications with the tribes under Abyssinia would be avoided.

I propose now to recall some 50 old Sniders with the western tribes, who are now under no immediate apprehension from raids by the Mullah's riflemen, and issue them to the Habr Yunis sections nearest to the Dolbahanta frontier.

I would ask for 300 more Sniders, with 100 rounds of ammunition per rifle. We shall be guided by circumstances as to how far it may be necessary to issue these arms, but I think we ought to have them available in the Protectorate; and if there are any in store they are not likely to be required elsewhere, being now an antiquated weapon.

A couple of pom-poms, or better still, two 7-pr. guns, of the pattern lately discarded by the mountain batteries, would be most useful; and with a subaltern of the Royal Artillery to train our men, we should soon get effective Somali gun detachments.

Acting on the authority conveyed in your Lordship's telegram of the 9th July last, I am now reducing the levy to the strength mentioned in this despatch, which Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne and I both consider is what is required to meet the military requirements. After the receipt of orders on this despatch any modifications will be made which your Lordship may desire.

The initial cost involved by these proposals will be small, as we have a supply of arms, ammunition, and equipment, and supplies, left over from the expedition.

I would solicit the favour of a telegram when orders are passed regarding the post at Burao, and the strength of the force to be temporarily retained there.

Inclosure 1 in No. 13.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

(Extract.) *Sheikh, July* 13, 1901.

AS desired by you, I have the honour to submit a report on the present position as regards the Mullah and the protection of our tribes.

After his defeat at Fardiddin, on the 17th instant, the Mullah fled into the Haud, his men scattering in all directions. A rendezvous had been arranged at a place some 30 miles east of Beretable on the Mijjertein border, where it was intended to re-concentrate the scattered portions as opportunity offered. The flight was so rapid that all the live-stock were left on the ground some 3 or 4 miles beyond the point at which our pursuit ceased. Chained prisoners, finding their guards gone, took the opportunity to break their leg-irons and get back to their tribes. Sheikhs of the Ogaden tribe who had been unwillingly compelled to join the Mullah left him, and some of them are now back with the Ogaden. The night after the flight of the Mullah a considerable number of riflemen came down to Fardiddin with a view to making their submission to us, but finding us gone, and being pursued by the Dervishes, the Mullah's most fanatical followers, they gave up the attempt to come to us.

I have no doubt that had my orders permitted me to remain at Beretable (I would have had to go to this place for water, there being none at Fardiddin) the Mullah's following, except the so-called Dervishes, would have gradually come over to us, and we would thereby have deprived the Mullah of the greater portion of his rifles. Although he is able now, thanks to the assistance of Sultan Othman Mahmood, to openly import as many rifles as he may want, at the same time, the falling-off of the number of his riflemen at the time when the Dolbahanta were thoroughly impressed with the Mullah's defeat, would have put heart into them to resist him; and there is not at present a single Dolbahanta tribe that wished to go back to its subjection to the Mullah, but all the Elders constantly, in speaking to me, came back to this point—they are absolutely unable to withstand without our assistance the riflemen of the Mullah. "What is the use of spears," they all said, "it would be as well for us all now to throw them down and take sticks! If you go back now we are certain to be punished for having left the Mullah and

for having made a peace with you. And we shall have to do all the Mullah wishes us, and even again attack your tribes under his orders."

This is not overstated. I am sure that presently, and we shall not have to wait long, the Mullah will attack the Mahmood Girad and use them to raid the Habr Toljaala and other Ishak tribes.

The fact is, whilst the Somalis had spears only, it was possible, with only a very small number of armed police, to administer the country, and there was nothing whatever to prevent us, had we wished it, to control the whole of the Dolbahanta and other tribes right down to the borders of our Protectorate. With the influx of fire-arms into the country, however, matters have changed, and unless we are prepared to lock up a considerable force in the interior, we can no longer prevent men who possess fire-arms from banding themselves together to rob and murder whom they choose and make administration impossible. At the same time, unless we administer the Dolbahanta, the Mullah will recover his lost ground, and a very large recruiting ground will be opened to him. I was impressed with the danger of the Dervish movement. Until I actually saw the Mullah's men fighting, I had no idea that a Somali could be so influenced by fanaticism.

I am speaking of the Dervishes, the men who, following the custom of the Suakin Dervishes, have thrown over father and mother and their own tribe to follow the Mullah. They have passwords—wear a white turban, and a special breviary, and have sworn to throw up all worldly advantages. Of course a certain number even of these Dervishes have joined the Mullah simply for the sake of loot, but there are, on the other hand, a considerable number who are pure fanatics. At Fardiddin and at McNeill's zariba these were the men who led, and who were shot down. At Fardiddin, after the others had fled, a number of these men remained behind to fight to the end, and were shot down as we advanced. When recording the names of the enemy's dead, I found that a large number were Hajis or Sheikhs.

Now, given an increased importation of fire-arms, and the spread of fanaticism over all the Dolbahanta country, we have possibilities before us which will make administration, even of the coast ports, difficult.

There is no doubt that the Mullah has lost prestige, and the Dolbahanta admit that they no longer think him inspired; but provided he has riflemen about him, he can compel every tribe in turn to join him, and there appears to be no reason why he should not increase the number of his riflemen indefinitely.

To conclude, I take it that the locking-up of a considerable force in the Dolbahanta country, so far away from support, would not commend itself to Government, and that, therefore, we must let the Dolbahanta go, and face the probability of their assisting the Mullah to attack our Ishak tribes.

Again, as regards the defence of the Ishak tribes, whom we are, I take it, bound to protect, seeing that they have now actually fought well under us in the levy, I do not think a mere post, however strong, either at Burao or any other place would much help them.

They want a certain number of riflemen in their karias ready at a moment's notice to turn out and defend their flocks, without having to wait for the help which could not arrive in time. These men must be in the karias and move about with them wherever they go for grazing.

At the same time, there should be a small force ready to act as a nucleus, and whose duty it would be to control the karia riflemen and prevent any misuse of the rifles.

I think the above arrangements would enable the Ishak tribes to hold their own against the Mullah for some time to come. Should the Mullah's armed following much increase, the idea of self-protecting karias could be expanded.

Of course there is just a chance that the Mullah may be killed by his own people. Many would like to remove him but are deterred from attempting anything owing to the very complete arrangements he has made to surround himself with guards. If he dies, either Hadji Sudi, his chief adviser, or somebody else, would probably succeed him. Somalis eyes are now thoroughly open to the advantages given by the possession of rifles and to the power conferred by them.

I think that a couple of pom-poms, or some light kind of field-gun—a Colt, or something of the kind—would be useful on certain occasions, and especially so for the defence of entrenched positions or for the coast towns. The tribes have a great respect for anything of the sort.

Inclosure 2 in No. 13.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *Ainabba, July* 26, 1901.

IN continuation of my despatch dated Kour Gerad, 18th July, I have the honour to report progress to date.

Marching viâ Eyl Maado, I connected up with my advanced base at Tifafleh, and thence, proceeding through the site of McNeill's zariba, arrived at Eyl Dab on the morning of the 24th. Owing to the condition of the wounded, I was unable to keep up my rate of marching, which for some three or four days averaged 23 miles a-day, and I had to make a half-day's halt here and there in order to rest men and animals. However, the rate of progress to Eyl Dab (130 miles) was about 18 miles a-day, including halts, so I hope it will seem that I have complied with your instructions to return at once with all possible expedition. I have rested here in order to fill up water to last us 80 miles to Burao, no water being reported on the way. Watering camels at these deep rocky wells is necessarily heavy work, and takes the whole day.

Information as to the Mullah's movements has been brought in from several sources, the principal being that supplied by prisoners who have broken their leg-irons and escaped from the Mullah, and by a Shereef who has also come away. It appears that a very large number of Dervishes (I refer to the fanatical section of the Mullah's followers, who are banded together apart from the rest) were killed, over 100 dead and wounded men, who have since died, having been carried away on camels and ponies. This is in addition to the sixty bodies counted by us on the ground. The Mullah himself, with a small party and loaded camels, fled for three days into the bush, and camels were killed in order to obtain water from the animals' stomachs. He intended to reunite his people some 30 miles eastward of Beretable, on the Mijjertein border. Many principal Mullahs have been killed, and nearly all his chained prisoners escaped and struck off their chains. The Habr Yunis and Ogaden were seeking to escape, but cannot get away without making provision for water, and they cannot arrange for camels. A considerable number of the Mullah's riflemen came, with their rifles, to Fardiddin the night after we had returned to Eyl Maado, intending to desert over to us; but, finding we had gone away, and being pursued by Dervishes, they returned to the Mullah.

After the fight at McNeill's zariba, the Mullah's men had run out of ammunition; but a caravan of seventy rifles, with quantities of ammunition, was received from Sultan Nur Osman, and this was followed by another caravan of fourteen rifles. Another caravan is on its way from Bosasa. These caravans are all run by Adan Madoba men—Deria Araleh, Abdilla Shehere, and Dualeh Adleh (ex-Berbera policeman). Camels are sent in charge of these men to Bosasa and Alula, where there is a ready and profitable sale for them. The whole matter is very simple. Sultan Osman Mahmud and his Councillors personally interest themselves in forwarding these caravans. Good prices being given, there is no reason why the Mullah should not continue, as he is doing, to receive monthly consignments of arms and ammunition.

Informants state that, now that the British force is returning, the men who have run away from the Mullah must return to him, and he will become more powerful than before, and will, without doubt, bring the Mahmud Gerad into subjection. Before he was dealt with at Fardiddin, the Mullah, hearing that the British force had returned from Bohotele, had everything ready to attack the Habr Yunis karias near Gonder Libah, meat and curds which were prepared being actually seized by us. The Mahmud Gerad say that the Mullah had ordered them to make an attack on the Ishak in the Berbera Plain, whilst the Jama Said and Berkad attacked Bulhar. He himself intended to attack the Habr Yunis and our post at Burao.

I have given above an epitome of information obtained from many sources and vouched for by Hajis and other respectable men.

The Dolbahanta tribes, who had all sent ergos to me tending their submission, now openly say they cannot withstand the Mullah when he returns, and will be compelled to join him against the Ishak.

Under your instructions I felt bound to return directly the Mullah was dealt with at Fairdiddin. It was unfortunate, perhaps, that I had had no opportunity of informing you of the fact beforehand that the Mullah had returned to the Dolbahanta, for it is probable, and even almost certain, that had you seen your way to allowing me some latitude in the matter, I would have, by remaining at Fardiddin, managed to bring over to us the greater part of the Mullah's riflemen and their arms, and even if the Mullah had

not been caught, he would have been so weakened by the loss of his arms as to make him incapable of subjecting the tribes once more. As it is, we have not seen the last of the Mullah.

The mounted infantry return to Burao to-day, water having been sent on in advance. The remainder of the column follows this evening.

Lieutenant Dickinson and all wounded are doing well. One wounded soldier died since Eyl Maado.

Our camels and ponies are somewhat exhausted owing to want of water and grazing. The Wadamago well is blocked up by a dead body. It appears a Berkad man was asphyxiated by the noxious fumes. Kirrit water is undrinkable, and the Olasan supply is exhausted and insufficient for my force. The mounted infantry should reach Burao on the night of the 28th instant, and the remainder of the troops on the 29th or 30th.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somaliland Field Force.

No. 14.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Consul-General Sadler.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September* 4, 1901.

AFTER careful consideration of your despatch of 1st August, His Majesty's Government feel unable to sanction Burao being permanently occupied, or a new corps being formed to hold either that place or other posts in the interior. You may retain a force under arms not exceeding the number proposed in your despatch as a provisional measure, and until effects of recent operations can be better estimated.

Pending further orders, however, you should make no purchases of camels, guns, or equipment.

His Majesty's Government sanction proposed distribution of rifles to friendly tribesmen.

No. 15.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received October 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Aden, October* 25, 1901.

MULLAH has returned to Dolbahanta and is reported at Helimadu. Situation is generally unsettled.

No. 16.

Consul-General Sadler to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 19.)

[Despatch relating to Field Operations.]

My Lord, *Bailey's Hotel, London, November* 18, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to submit Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's final Report on the operations recently undertaken under his command against the Mullah, Muhammad-bin-Abdullah, in Somaliland.

The rise of the fanatical movement headed by this Mullah and the reasons why it became necessary to put it down by armed force are detailed in despatches dating from April 1899, which have since been published in Parliamentary papers—"Africa No. 5 (1901)". Reports have also been submitted from time to time on the progress made in the raising and equipment of the native levy, and of the operations conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne in the field.

The original plan of campaign was that the Abyssinian force, which was to co-operate with ours, should drive the Mullah from his position in the western Ogaden, towards Bohotele, where our force would deal with him. The Abyssinian expedition, however, moved into the Ogaden before our preparations could be completed; it effected its purpose, but did not ever come into touch with our force.

I would avail myself of this opportunity to acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered to the Protectorate in the suppression of the Mullah's movement by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, His Britannic Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Addis Abbaba, whose conduct of our relations with the Emperor Menelek alone rendered possible the undertaking of concerted action with Abyssinia against the Mullah.

Active operations commenced on the 22nd May last, when an advance was made from our advanced base at Burao. The Mullah was located in the central Dolbahanta with a force of some 5,000 men, mounted and foot, with about 500 rifles. He could also count on support from large numbers of tribal spearmen, whose attitude it was known would depend on the result of the first conflict with the enemy. Our force consisted of 1,500 men of the levy, 50 Punjabi Mahommedan Sepoys from India, and a number of spearmen employed on transport work. Operations ceased with the return of the expedition to Burao on the 29th and 30th July.

The operations conducted during this period under the able command of Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne were completely successful. The enemy were defeated on three occasions with heavy loss, and the Mullah and the remnants of his force were twice driven out of the Protectorate in hot pursuit, finally to seek a refuge in the Mijjertein country beyond our border, thoroughly disorganized and dispirited; and tribes who had actively supported the Mullah from the first were pursued and punished.

As a result of these operations undertaken over a large area in a difficult and for the most part waterless country, with no means of support in case of a reverse, the tribes both in the Dolbahanta and the Ogaden country south of our border sent in emissaries to renounce the Mullah and sue for pardon. This was granted to them subject to good behaviour and on the understanding that they held aloof from any further dealings with the Mullah, who being still at large was capable of causing further trouble hereafter. Our authority was thus restored over a large portion of the Protecterate, where for the last two and a-half years the Mullah's movement had remained unchecked for want of means to cope with it, and at the same time friendly relations were renewed with the tribes who trade with our Protectorate and inhabit the country to the south of our border.

It will be within your Lordship's recollection that in the instructions* issued to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne I desired that one portion of any live-stock captured should be applied to compensate our tribes for the losses they had suffered at the Mullah's hands, one portion be given the Somalis of the levy as prize-money, and one portion be set-off against the cost of the expedition. The distribution was mainly made on these lines, but I have not yet received the final Report of distribution. One hundred animals were made over for the benefit of the Berbera Poor-house, which for months had supported women and children rendered destitute by the Mullah's raids; none were given to the hospital.

I would wish to bring prominently to your Lordship's favourable consideration for promotion and reward the eminent services rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne in raising and organizing the levy, and in planning and conducting his operations to a successful issue. He has shown powers of organization and generalship to a marked degree, and it would be difficult to speak too highly of the able manner in which the work intrusted to him was planned and carried out. I fully indorse the favourable mention Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne has made of the services of the officers acting under his orders, and I trust your Lordship may be pleased to consider the recommendations he has recorded.

Major Beynon, D.S.O., ably commanded the mounted branch, and was assisted by Captains Mereweather and Bruce, in command of the mounted infantry and cavalry, respectively. The mounted branch did good service in covering the advance of the infantry, in surprising by forced marches and capturing the enemy's live-stock, and in completing the rout of the Mullah and his followers by sharp pursuit beyond the border.

Captain Phillips is commended as a thoroughly reliable and capable officer. I had ample demonstration at Burao of the efficiency to which he had quickly brought his corps by his powers of organization. I trust that the ability he has shown during this expedition may be considered in connection with the services he has already rendered in other parts of Africa.

The defence of his position at Somala by Captain McNeill was a brilliant affair. Three successive attacks in force were repulsed, and finally the enemy, who outnumbered him by more than twelve to one, were beaten off with heavy loss. His services on this

* See "Africa No. 5 (1901)," p. 87.

occasion amply deserve recognition. Lieutenant Lamprey's name is brought forward by Captain McNeill for good service performed in the defence of the camel zariba, which formed portion of the position held at Somala.

Major the Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy, assisted by Captain Cobbold, held a position with the Abyssinian force which called for the exercise of much tact and diplomacy, and in which he was able to render valuable assistance to the Abyssinian Commander, thus winning the warm appreciation of the Emperor Menelek. His reports testify to the difficulties he had to encounter, and I would recommend to your Lordship's favourable notice the services he has rendered whilst attached to the Abyssinian expedition.

It was with deep regret that I had to report the loss of two valuable and experienced officers, who devoted themselves to their work with the levy, and who would have risen to distinction had they lived—Lieutenant de Sausmarez, K.R.R., accidentally shot at Burao, and Captain Friedrichs, R.E., killed in action at Furdiddin.

Mr. Gerolimato, British Vice-Consul at Harrar, rendered useful assistance in keeping me informed of the progress of affairs at Harrar, and of the movements, so far as they could be ascertained, of the Abyssinian force operating in the Ogaden. I would place on record the fact that, in deference to what he knew would be my wish, Mr. Gerolimato postponed an application he had intended to make for leave of absence in order to remain at his post till the conclusion of the expedition.

I gladly indorse Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's mention of the aid given him by Lieutenant Cordeaux in his capacity of His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Berbera. The troubles caused by the Mullah's movement threw a large amount of extra work on Lieutenant Cordeaux which was readily and cheerfully performed; and throughout he gave me the most loyal assistance in our dealings, at times anxious, with the tribes.

I trust that Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's request that a medal and clasp be given to all ranks serving with the expedition may meet with your Lordship's favourable consideration. Many of our Somalis served with the Italians, and show with pride the medals they received for the actions in which they were engaged. On political grounds alone the issue of a medal for the operations lately concluded would be expedient.

I would also recommend that some native title be created to reward native officers and officials who perform meritorious service in our African Protectorates, similar to the titles conferred by the Indian Government on deserving Mahommedan officials.

Ressaldar Musa Farih is a native officer eminently deserving of such a title, and I should wish to see one conferred on him, both on account of the good services he has performed for years past and the influential position he holds amongst his countrymen in Somaliland.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

Sir, *London, November* 10, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my final Report on the recent operations conducted under my command in Somaliland.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Somali Levy.*

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

[Despatch relating to Field Operations.]

Sir, *London, November* 10, 1901.

Scope of despatch.

1. IN continuation of my despatches of June and July last, I have the honour to submit a final Report on the raising of the Somali levy and the operations which resulted in the disorganization, and expulsion from the British Protectorate, of the Mullah Abdilla Hassan's armed following.

Decision to raise levy.

2. The raising of the levy dates back to the latter end of November 1900, when, owing to the decision to withdraw the 2nd Battalion King's Central Africa Rifles, it became necessary to make some other arrangement to face the Mullah.

3. The position at this time was as follows:—

Position of affairs at start.

The Mullah, after his raids on the Abyssinians at Jig-Jiga, and his subsequent attacks upon our Habr Awal tribe, had moved westward to the pools of Harradiggit, situated in the Haud desert, 170 miles south of the Ishak border.

During August, September, and October our tribes, who had already suffered very severely from his raids, were kept in a state of perpetual alarm owing to the operations of bands of the Mullah's reconnoitring horsemen.

They had consequently retired to the arid coast region, where there was insufficient grazing to keep their flocks and herds alive for many days.

Formerly, although raids between the tribes were continual, a rough balance of power had existed, but the importation of arms by the Darud tribes, who supported the Mullah, absolutely altered this state of things, and placed the outlying sections of our Ishak tribes completely at the Mullah's mercy.

Classification of tribes in three main groups.

4. The tribes in Northern Somaliland may be classed into three main divisions: the Ishak, Darud, and Dir.

The Ishak are tribes within the Protectorate, with whom we have Treaties, to which, in 1886, "protective clauses" were added. These tribes, if we exclude a few fanatical individuals who were unsupported by their fellows, were at this time hostile to the Mullah and friendly to us.

The Darud, on the other hand, comprise the Ogaden clans south and outside of our Protectorate, and also the Dolbahanta, the bulk of whom were at this time actively supporting the Mullah, and hostile to us.

The Dir include the Esa and Gadabursi in the neighbourhood of Zeyla, remote from the scene of operations, and unaffected by them.

It will be convenient, therefore, to bear in mind that, although the Administration at all times discriminated between the friendly and unfriendly sections of the Darud, and endeavoured to disabuse the people of the idea that the Darud, as a whole, were considered hostile to us, the Somali tribes generally, nevertheless, looked upon the Ishak as being on the side of Government and the Darud as being hostile.

Alarm of the coast tribes.

5. Thousands of live-stock of the Ishak had been raided, and men, women, and children slaughtered. Numbers of children died from the want of milk, and the coast towns became full of destitute fugitives. The alarm spread even to Berbera and Bulhar.

Regular troops unsuitable to country.

6. The country is unsuitable to the employment of regular troops owing to its great distances and the scarcity of water and pasture. There is no cultivation whatever, and no food is obtainable, once the coast is left, except meat.

Regulars cannot afford adequate protection to surrounding tribes.

7. Moreover, the tribes had no confidence in the ability of regular troops to afford protection from devastating raids.

Example of disadvantage of regulars.

8. Regular troops had been employed in the operations against the Esa tribe in 1891. They suffered from the heat and want of water. The enemy, having greater mobility, was able to avoid the troops, and chose his opportunity for attack. At Hussein a small body of Esa rushed the camp, held by over 350 troops, and inflicted, in the dark, a considerable loss in killed and wounded.

Mobility of tribal horsemen.

9. It is by no means unusual for Somali horsemen whilst on a raid to cover 60 or 70 miles in the day, and even men on foot will cover over 50 miles.

The Mullah's raids.

10. The Mullah, being fully aware of the advantage conferred by superior mobility, disregarded our posts at Adadleh and Hargeisa, and successfully carried out his two most

disastrous raids on our tribes, at a time when the 2nd Battalion King's Africa Rifles were holding posts in the interior.

11. It was therefore recognized that, in order to give adequate protection, and reassure the tribes, it was necessary to have troops capable of moving as fast as the enemy. Native levy decided on.

Under these circumstances our requirements could only be met by a local levy, which could travel fast and could live entirely, if necessary, on the country. Sick men would not hamper rapid movement, as they could be sent back to their tribes on camels; moreover, an irregular levy had the advantage of being inexpensive.

12. I received orders from you on the 22nd November, 1900, to raise, as a preliminary measure, a sufficient number of men to replace the regulars. Orders to commence raising the levy.

13. In less than a week 250 men, comprising eight sections under the command of Coast Police Sepoys as N.C.Os., were raised, armed and equipped, and taught the use of their rifles. 250 men raised as a preliminary measure.

14. They were marched inland by me on the 28th November, and the regular detachments at Adadleh and Hargeisa, 55 miles and 100 miles distant from Berbera, were relieved on the morning of the 1st and 2nd December respectively, and supplies of rations and ammunition were taken over at both places. Regular detachments in interior relieved.

15. A defensible masonry block-house for the storage of ammunition was built at Adadleh. Block-house built at Adadleh.

16. No rifles had yet arrived from England, so the new levies were armed with the spare Martini-Henry and Snider rifles of the Coast Police, and later on, when, on my return from Hargeisa on the 4th December, new sections were raised, such other serviceable rifles of various calibres as were available in the Protectorate were utilized. Provision of arms.

On the departure of the regulars, 150 Martini-Enfield single-loading ·303 rifles were left on loan to the Protectorate, and these also immediately passed into the hands of the new levies.

17. There was at this time, owing to the feeling of exasperation caused by the sufferings of the people, no difficulty in obtaining infantry recruits, even at the low rate of pay of 12 rupees a-month, a rate 4 rupees less than that given to the Coast Police. On the first day some 1,200 men came forward. Popularity of levy.

In selecting men, only those vouched for by responsible Chiefs, and those belonging to trustworthy tribes were enlisted, no Dolbahanta being allowed to enter the ranks.

18. Every man, before marching out of Berbera, was paid an allowance to purchase his own Somali shoes, and also a piece of American cloth. Extra hides and spare steel were sent up with the sections, and the men, amongst whom were many shoemakers and workers in iron, made and repaired their own shoes, and made axes with which to cut thorn-bushes. On the march thorn zaribas were made every night. Interior economy.

19. In the beginning of December, when an expedition was sanctioned, you authorized me to increase the infantry of the levy up to 1,000, and later on, to form a mounted corps of 500 men. Sanctioned increase of levy to 500.

20. As I was at this time alone, I had had to personally conduct the detachments up-country, and as this involved journeys of 200 miles to Hargeisa and back, I now found it impossible to spare the four days occupied by the journey. More officers necessary.

21. Much work had to be done at the coast in bringing over riding camels from Aden, in purchasing transport animals and supplies, and in sending caravans up-country. Details of work.

Estimates had to be prepared, and arms, equipment, clothing, stores, water-tanks, &c., ordered from England, Egypt, or India.

22. I found it necessary, therefore, to apply for the immediate services of two Subalterns in order to take charge of the up-country posts, and on the 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles sailing from the coast, the services of Lieutenants Byrne and Walshe were placed at my disposal. They were at once sent up to take charge of the levies at Hargeisa and Adadleh (50 miles apart). whilst I continued to enlist men at Berbera. Two officers lent by 2nd King's African Rifles.

23. The raising of the mounted infantry gave much trouble. As soon as he could be spared from Hargeisa, Lieutenant Byrne was sent westward to Dobolek, where the Chiefs had agreed to bring up horsemen for enlistment. Difficulty in raising mounted infantry.

He succeeded in raising 100 men, bringing their own ponies and saddles, but owing to the threatening attitude of the Rer Ali Ogaden, and to the consequent disinclination

of our tribes to leave their flocks unguarded, further enlistment came to a standstill.

Proposal to overcome hindrance.

24. Owing to the hindrance caused to my plans, I had the honour to ask permission, as a preliminary measure, to deal with the Rer Ali. Men, transport, and supplies were concentrated at Hargeisa, and two sections of riflemen were sent 50 miles southwards to observe the border. You were unable, however, at this time on political grounds, to sanction an advance across our border.

Failure of Gadabursi horsemen to join.

25. The Gadabursi, whose Chiefs had promised to produce a contingent of horsemen, failed to do so, although Mr. Keyser, His Majesty's Consul at Zeyla, used every endeavour to induce them to come forward. The tribes in this part of the Protectorate had not suffered from the Mullah's raids, and being of separate origin to the Ishak tribes, were not affected by the latter's misfortunes.

Purchase of ponies and enlistment of tribal horsemen with spears.

26. In order to fill up my mounted branch I found it necessary to apply for sanction to purchase ponies and mount my infantry on them, and even then the Mounted Corps filled up so slowly that it was not complete when the time came for starting. I had to enlist extra infantry to make up the deficit, and also to arrange for getting in tribal horsemen with spears during the progress of operations.

Tribal spearmen or transport.

27. A number of spearmen were also enlisted for a transport corps. These men were not continuously employed, but were called up for service or discharged as found necessary.

Their duties were mainly connected with the charge and protection of captured live-stock sent back from the front, and a certain number assisted the transport riflemen, and were utilized as spies and for reconnoitring work at a distance from the field columns.

The men for the greater part received no pay but were given a bonus out of the live-stock captured from the enemy.

600 men enlisted by the middle of January.

28. By the middle of January, when the first British officers began to arrive on the coast, 600 men had already been raised and the detachments at Hargeisa and Adadleh were considerably strengthened.

Further raids by the Mullah checked.

29. These arrangements not only kept matters quiet after the departure of the regulars, but, owing to the exaggerated reports of our strength which reached the Mullah, he became apprehensive of raids by our levies and tribes on his own live-stock, and so confined himself to looking to his own protection, and abandoned the idea of making any further organized attacks upon our border.

British officers, N.C.Os.

30. Altogether 21 officers joined me, viz., 1 Major, 6 Captains, 1 medical officer, and 13 subalterns.

When the levy was sanctioned no local military establishments existed with the exception of the Coast Police, of whom some forty men were available for the charge of sections.

Likely men of the levy were made acting non-commissioned officers, and taught by four Indian havildars lent me from Aden. The latter returned to India when the Somalis were sufficiently advanced to take charge of sections.

Organization into three corps.

31. The infantry was divided into two corps of 500 men each, and the camelry and mounted infantry formed one corps.

The Mounted Corps was commanded by Major Benyon, D.S.O., I.S.C., and he was assisted by Captain Bruce, R.F.A., who had charge of the Camel Corps, and Captain Merewether, I.S.C., commanding the mounted infantry.

The two infantry corps were respectively commanded by Captain Phillips, R.E., and Captain Mc'Neill, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.

Staff.

32. Captain Friedrichs, R.E., was appointed Adjutant, Lieutenant Byrne, Transport Officer, and Lieutenant Dickinson, Quartermaster.

Ressaldar Musa Farah raised and commanded one of the mounted infantry companies, and besides, acted as Ressaldar Major to the force. Owing to his intimate knowledge of Somali customs and his influence with the tribes, I placed under his charge the arrangements for tribal scouting work.

Intelligence.

33. Spies and strong patrols were sent 100 miles south to report on the Mullah's movements, and to capture prisoners and so obtain information. A number of the Mullah's spies were caught and caravans taking supplies to him were captured.

The Rer Guled coerced into good behaviour.

34. The Rer Guled of the Eidegalla were at this time trafficking with the Mullah, and being an Ishak tribe in the midst of our own people, it was necessary to coerce them into good behaviour.

Ressaldar Musa Farah by a rapid march with two sections succeeded in capturing and bringing in some of the chief men, and these I found it convenient to attach to the expedition as a guarantee for the tribes' good behaviour. This measure allayed the anxiety of the levies as to the safety of their flocks during their absence.

The Eidegalla behaved well, and I was able, at the end of operations, to express my satisfaction by making them a substantial present out of the captured camels.

35. In February, owing to the Hardiggit pool drying up, the Mullah was compelled to shift quarters, aud consequently withdrew to the southern edge of the Haud desert, to a pool of water called Mersin. Mullah leaves Haradiggit in February for Mersin.

36. The Abyssinians, after the Mullah's attack on their post at Jig-Jiga, recognized the gravity of the danger to their position amongst the Mahommedan tribes at Harrar, and decided to address the British Government with a view to a joint expedition. Abyssinian co-operation.

37. In January a force of Abyssinians, which eventually reached 15,000 men, was sent down to the western edge of the Haud, from Jig-Jiga towards Gerlogubi, with orders to block that side of the country to the Mullah and prevent any chance of his combining with the Ogaden tribes, with whom Colonel Ternan's expedition was at this time dealing. 15,000 Abyssinians block the Western Ogaden country to the Mullah.

38. In February, owing to the operations of the Abyssinians, the Mullah found it necessary to leave Mersin. He had attempted to combine the Ogaden against them, but these tribes having been badly treated by him, would not now help, and on the punishment of one of their outlying sections by the Abyssinians, the Mullah found himself compelled to retire eastward to Bohotle to our Dolbahanta tribes, his own kinsmen, who have always proved to be the backbone of his following. Mullah leaves Mersin for Dolbahanta country.

39. Shipments of ammunition began to arrive at Berbera on the 10th January, and were followed by the rifles on the 7th February. *Arrival of rifles and ammunition.*

40. The newly raised levies were put to the work of unloading, and earned commendation by their willingness to perform fatigue work, to which, until then, they had been totally unused, and which is generally disliked by Somalis. *Ships unloaded* entirely by troops.

41. All officers worked well together and recruiting, training, equipment, and musketry instruction were quickly pushed forward. Training.

42. A credit was afforded me on the Berbera Treasury, and all camels, ponies, supplies. and articles purchased locally were paid for on the spot in cash. Accounts.

Later on an account was opened with the Aden branch of the National Bank of India, in order to enable me to pay by cheque for debts incurred on account of transit charges and local purchases.

Small advances of pay were made to the men in order to provide for the maintenance of their families during their absence in the interior.

43. Messrs. Cowasji Dinshaw Brothers transhipped all stores and brought them in their steamers to the coast. They performed this work well. Some delay was caused by stores being, through error, over-carried to Ceylon. Transhipment of stores at Aden

44. The men learnt to shoot quickly, and in a competition held at Burao in May actually shot better than the Punjabi detachment. Their volleys at 600 and 800 yards were well directed and fire discipline became good. Quickness of Somalis at learning to shoot.

45. Buglers quickly learnt the few calls I found it necessary to teach them. Buglers.

46. The fifty Punjabis, who had been sent for from India to act as havildars, drill instructors, and maxim gun detachments, unfortunately arrived on the coast only on the eve of the expedition leaving Burao, when I had been compelled to do what I could with such scanty material as was available in the shape of police on the coast. 50 Punjabis from India.

47. I therefore decided to keep them as a separate body and the Somalis were allowed to continue their work, the three maxim guns, which had been fitted to riding camels, being managed entirely by them, under the direction of Lieutenants Thorpe and Lamprey. Maxims.

48. Whilst enlistment was going on there was much sickness in the low coast region, and over 300 men had to be discharged and other men enlisted instead. Difficulties caused by sickness and want of grazing.

The want of grazing also caused much difficulty. The camels as quickly as they were purchased were sent up-country with supplies, and then had to be driven out to the grazing grounds some 40 miles distant from the interior levy-posts.

49. The rains which should ordinarily have fallen in the first week in April were insufficient to bring out the grass, and a bad drought followed during April and May. All animals had therefore to be constantly on the move, roaming about in search of food, and it became necessary to detach numnrous parties of the levy to guard them. Even with the greatest care over 100 died and the remainder became so debilitated as to compel a postponement of the advance. Insufficient rainfall and consequent debility of camels.

50. On the Mullah's move eastward from Mersin to the Dolbahanta country, a corresponding change of base on our part became necessary. Mullah's move eastward necessitates corresponding move on our part.

Transfer of advanced base to Burao.

51. In April men and stores were shifted, partly with our own transport and partly with hired animals from Adadleh to Burao. The latter place was quite bare and the animals had therefore to be brought back some 40 miles to graze at Eyl-Humma.

Supply caravans from Berbera.

52. A defensible post was made at Burao and strengthened with barbed wire, and supply caravans were sent up from Berbera by the direct route over the Sheikh Pass. The reserve ammunition at the Adadleh block-house was, for safety, moved to Burao.

The tribes at this time of the year require all their transport animals in order to shift their encampments when changing ground in search of grass; moreover, their animals equally with ours were dying for the want of food. Much time was consequently taken up at Adadleh in interviews with tribal Elders, who, however, eventually did what they were asked to do in the way of supplying transport.

Supplies: how calculated.

53. Supplies were calculated on the assumption that the force would require twenty days' food carried for it forward from Burao, plus twelve days' live-stock.

Besides this a month's rations was to be held in reserve at Burao, and another month's food was to be sent up to Burao from Berbera during the progress of operations.

All the supplies sent up by me in December and January were consumed during the time occupied by the organization and training of the levies.

Lieutenant Murray was directed to take charge of the supplies at Burao.

Grazing for ponies.

54. The mounted infantry ponies were grazed at the foot of the Golis range, where the only suitable grass for horses at this time was to be found.

Intelligence.

55. Whilst the movement to Burao was in progress steps were taken to stop the Mullah's sources of information. His spies in the Ishak country were either captured or driven away; caravans taking stores to the Mullah were apprehended within a radius of 60 miles, and a body of his scouts were surprised 30 miles south of Burao near Idoweina.

Caravans coming in from the interior to Berbera were, as a rule, not interfered with, as it was not desirable or necessary to stop trade; moreover, I derived much useful information from them.

Our own spies penetrated to the Rer Hagar Dolbahanta encampments at Ainabba and Balliwein, 75 miles south of Burao, and strong patrols acting on their information captured prisoners in the enemy's country, who supplied us with information. Some of these prisoners, after being misled as to our real line of advance were allowed to escape at night, in order to return to the Mullah and deceive him. In order to assist in this object the Dolbahanta tribes at Bohotle were ordered to have sheep ready for the consumption of the force at Bohotle.

Donkeys for hospital and Punjabis.

56. A number of donkeys were purchased to assist in hospital transport and to be at the disposal, for riding purposes, of twenty selected Punjabis whom I had decided to take on from Burao to my advanced field base.

Only 20 Punjabis taken on as far as Samali.

57. The rest of the Punjabis I left in the Burao post, as their slower rate of marching, and the amount of water and snpplies which they would have required, would have considerably hampered our movements.

Delay increases efficiency.

58. Captain Phillips, who commanded at Burao, took the opportunity afforded by the delay caused by the postponement of the rains to perfect his men in musketry practice, and you were pleased to inspect the men and commend the progress made.

Lieutenant de Sausmarez accidentally shot.

59. About this time, whilst I was at Eyl-Humma, the expedition had the misfortune to lose Lieutenant de Sausmarez, K.R.R., who died from an accidental gun-shot wound. The circumstances of the case were fully reported to you by a Board of Inquiry, assembled by my orders at Burao.

Lieutenant de Sausmarez was one of the most promising officers, very popular with both officers and men, and had just come up from South Africa where he had been in action with his regiment on Waggon Hill.

Object of expedition.

60. Your orders were to capture or defeat the Mullah and to put an end to his influence in the Dolbahanta country.

It was borne in mind, that once the expedition started, no support could be given from the rear.

Somalis cannot do without camels.

61. In Somaliland, life revolves round the camel. The people live on the milk for the greater part of the year, and without the camel the best grazing grounds distant from water, would be unattainable, for sheep have to be kept near the wells. Without the camel the bulk of the people could not exist.

Important to capture live-stock.

62. In forming plans of attack, therefore, it was important to bear in mind that if the flocks and herds of the enemy could be captured the men would inevitably be compelled either to make terms or to collect to attack the expedition.

63. The all-important point was to march faster than the enemy and be able to surprise him instead of his surprising us. Slow movement meant the possibility of attack by overwhelming masses of the enemy who would have had time to collect, and safety lay in rapidity of action, and consequent disorganization of the enemy's plans. Mobility essential.

64. The Mullah's force was reported to consist of some 5,000 men, the greater part of whom were horsemen, and he probably had some 600 rifles. The tribes on whom he might draw for support probably mustered another 20,000, but these were not able to gather together for more than a day or two owing to the want of grazing for their numerous ponies. Estimate of numbers of possible opponents.

In addition, doubtful tribes, who would probably have joined the Mullah in case of our suffering a reverse, possibly had some 60,000 spearmen, and the Mijjertein tribes within the Italian sphere of influence, most of whom, however, were too distant to help the Mullah, had been estimated by the Resident at Aden at from 60,000 to 70,000 men.

65. His Majesty's Consul-General had sent out Proclamations informing tribes that only those who continued to assist the Mullah would be considered hostile to us, and warning them that tribes as a whole would be held responsible for the acts of individuals. Proclamations to the tribes.

I gave hostile tribes frequent opportunities of making their submission, and later on, after every action, captured Chiefs were sent to them to explain that, provided they left the Mullah, we would cease to be hostile.

66. It was intended to march direct on the Mullah wherever the latest information should have located him, and at the same time, by striking out at the hostile tribes on the right and left of the line of march, to drive them back out of touch with him. Plan of attack.

I hoped early to capture sufficient live-stock to be able to drop the bulk of my transport at a point within striking distance of the Mullah and then advance as light as possible by forced marches to the attack.

67. In order to avoid delay, which might have occurred further on, the expedition was divided into two columns, each of which was complete in itself, 200 camels being attached for water alone. Two columns formed.

68. The first column, consisting of the bulk of the levy, was under my personal command; it was made as light as possible and a reserve of rations and live-stock was brought up by the second column, which consisted of some 20 Punjabis and 350 Somali Rifles, with a number of spearmen for transport work, all under Captain McNeill. Both columns were to march and camp together until a favourable opportunity of making a sudden attack on the enemy should present itself, upon which the first column would leave all transport animals, except those necessary for the carriage of water, barbed wire, and wounded men, with the second column, the men relying for their food upon the herds of camels which could be quickly driven with them. Columns: how worked.

69. In the middle of May, although Burao was still parched, rain was reported to have fallen sufficiently in the Haud to make a move possible. Rains fall in the interior.

70. On the 20th May, therefore, the levies were concentrated with some 800 transport animals at Burao and the Mounted Infantry and Camel Corps were brought up simultaneously from the Golis range, 45 miles distant. Concentration at Burao.

A new site, commanding the wells, was chosen, and strongly entrenched.

71. On the 22nd, the force, leaving a garrison under three British officers with a month's reserve rations, marched 18 miles to Ber. Start from Burao on the 22nd May.

72. The order of march was generally an elastic square, transport in the centre, and Mounted Corps half a-day's march ahead, preceded by scouts and spies. Mounted men and detached parties were also sent well out on both flanks and to the rear. Order of march.

73. At Ber, a check of three days occurred owing to a number of transport spearmen who were expected to join from the Habr-Toljaala tribe, not turning up. Three days' halt at Ber.

74. Before leaving Burao spies and scouts had been sent out to keep two days' march ahead of the columns, and to send back from time to time, such information as they were able to obtain, and to capture prisoners with this object. On leaving Ber on the 25th May last, the information, of which, for some time, we had been in possession that the Mullah was at Yaheyl, having moved there through Bohotle and Lasadar was confirmed. Information at time of start.

The Dolbahanta tribes were reported to be much scattered for the want of grazing; the Rer Haggarr and Arasama having gone southward towards Balliwein and Bohotle, and the Jama Siad and Barkad, westward towards the eastern end of the Bur-Dab range.

75. Night marches were made so as to avoid the clouds of dust which would have indicated the march of the column, and a line of advance was chosen to avoid as Night marches.

much as possible dense bush, and bring us between the various sections of the hostile tribes.

Ber to Eyl-Dab, 72 miles.

76. Eyl-Dab, 72 miles distant from Ber, was reached on the evening of the 28th, in three days' forced marching over the waterless desert; the mounted corps being generally half a-day ahead and keeping up connection with the scouts further ahead.

Kob-Fardod village burnt.

77. On the way, the Mullah's stockaded village, and former head-quarters, at Kob-Fardod was burnt; mosques being spared so as not to offend Mahommedan feeling.

Transport marching on a broad front.

78. The transport, after a little practice, even through thick bush at night, was able to march on a broad front of some six or seven strings of camels.

Supply of water for officers.

79. A sufficient of water was obtained in the rain-pools at Ber to last the officers for 100 miles; the water obtainable at Eyl-Dab and Ainabba being only drinkable by Somalis.

Mullah's caravan captured.

80. At Eyl-Dab our scouts had captured a Mullah's caravan and had located the various Dolbahanta tribes.

Attitude of Mahmud Gerad.

81. I was anxious to punish the sections of the Mahmud Gerad Dolbahanta who had joined the Mullah, and raided our Habr Taljaala tribes, as the bulk of the tribe was wavering, and it was probable that a sudden blow would decide them to leave the Mullah alone and return north.

The tribe lay generally on the left flank of our line of march, and as there was some danger of its raiding as far as Berbera after we had passed, it was necessary to take steps to prevent this and so to reassure our men as to the safety of the women and children they had left behind them.

Mounted corps sent out to surprise Mahmud Gerad.

82. Moreover, we wanted live-stock badly so as to be able to leave heavy bags of rice and dates behind. Hearing now from prisoners that some encampments of the Jama Siad section of the Mahmud Gerad tribe were some 50 miles off, near Muyo, on the left of our line of advance to Yaheyl, I decided the opportunity was favourable, and sent off the mounted corps under Major Beynon to surprise them. The prisoners acted as guides.

Infantry continued to march towards Mullah's position.

83. Simultaneously the infantry of both columns continued its march on the Mullah's position south of Yaheyl, approaching it by an easterly detour which, besides avoiding the dense bush, enabled us to take advantage of the grass plains and to make night marches.

Arrival at Samali, the 30th May.

84. The columns reached a pool of rain-water at Samali on the 30th May.

News of captures of mounted corps.

85 News was here brought in that the mounted corps had succeeded in surprising the Jama Siad sections of the Mahmud Gerad, and I therefore decided, this being a convenient advanced position, to await here the arrival of the captured herds.

Advanced base formed at Samali, and strong zariba made.

86. A strong zariba, overlooking the wells, was therefore constructed on a low hill which was admirably adapted for defence, and barbed wire was plentifully used to strengthen the work.

Before leaving Samali, being aware that the captured camels and our transport would prove a strong temptation for attack from the enemy, Captain NcNeill was directed to double the zariba, and to fill water tanks to use as cover against the enemy's rifle fire. Captain McNeill carried out this work to my entire satisfaction, and the excellent disposition of the Maxim, on a cairn of stones commanding the zariba, afterwards contributed to a large extent to the repulse of the enemy.

Arrival of mounted corps with captures.

87. Sections were sent out to support the incoming mounted corps, and these presently arrived with some 300 captured camels, having covered some 90 miles and driven the hostile section of the Mahmud Gerad in flight northwards, thus separating them from the Mullah.

Greater part of Mahmud Gerad make terms.

88. In consequence of this action the Mahmud Gerad, who aggregate some 20,000 men, now, with the exception of the most southern and easterly clan, the Nur Ahmed, sent in deputations to make terms, and bound themselves to oppose the Mullah.

Mullah's hand forced.

89. It was foreseen that the Mullah would now be compelled to meet us, or lose all prestige with the tribes.

Captain McNeill's command at Samali.

90. Captain McNeill was left with the second column and details of the first column, aggregating some 370 rifles and 70 spearmen, a few tribal horsemen being attached for the purpose for keeping him informed of the approach of the enemy, and for rounding in the camels if suddenly attacked.

Punjabis left at Samali.

91. The twenty Punjabis, who had so far accompanied the column, were left here in order to still further reduce transport and increase rapidity of movement. They were unable to live on meat alone, like the Somalis.

92. On the 2nd June, when the ponies of the mounted infantry had had a day's rest after their hard work, and when all was ready, the first column, leaving behind all surplus rations, and taking only water and hospital camels, and driving eating camels for rations, moved on to Weyla Hedd, to which place the Mullah had by this time transferred his head-quarters. The direct route through the difficult Higlole Pass, where an attack under unfavourable conditions for us might take place, was not used, the open plains eastward towards Tifafleh being traversed. First column continues march on Mullah, the 2nd June.

The events which followed are already described in my despatches of the 13th and 21st June.

93. The Mullah, compelled to act, owing to the clamours of his Jama Siad allies, whose camels had been seized by the mounted infantry, advanced with some 5,000 horse and foot from Ano Hadigle, 80 miles through the Higlole Pass, and, avoiding the stronger column, attacked Captain McNeill's post on the 2nd and 3rd June. Mullah's advance against Samali.

94. His attacks were bold and persistent but were beaten off by Captain McNeill with a loss to the enemy, which I do not think can have fallen far short of 600 casualties. Over 180 dead bodies were found in the immediate vicinity of the zariba, and the first column afterwards continually came across dead bodies and wounded men. His attacks repulsed by Captain McNeill.

Captain McNeill has already submitted you, direct, a full report.

95. In attempting to return to Ano Hadigle the Mullah was compelled to pass through Odogoi, where the column under my command had by now cut him off from his base. His retreat was converted into a rout, and his people scattered in all directions and fled into the Haud. Enemy whilst retreating meets main column.

96. The Mullah himself, having continual changes of horses, was able to escape with great difficulty, after a pursuit which was carried on through night and day and was not discontinued until his people had been driven over 150 miles away from Captain McNeill's zariba. Flight of the Mullah and dispersal of his force.

His scattered forces, utterly demoralized by continual losses due to our rifle fire, crossed the Italian border, and, dropping various articles everywhere in the bush, did not stop until they had crossed the Haud waterless desert, many dying of thirst on the way and many prisoners falling into our hands.

97. Owing to our ponies having been ridden to a standstill and to the large percentage of deaths which had occurred amongst them, and to the fact that I could not cross the Haud until I had obtained more water tins from my advanced base at Samali, I found it necessary to postpone further pursuit. Pursuit postponed.

98. The Mullah had taken refuge with Sultan Othman Mahmud's people at Mudug, and before making arrangements to cross the waterless desert to attack him it was incumbent on me, Sultan Othman Mahmud being an Italian protégé, to refer to Government for instructions. Instructions asked for.

99. The delay, which must occur before an answer could be received, was utilized by me in connecting up with Captain McNeill, 96 miles westward, at Lasadar, and in dealing with the hostile tribes, who furnished the Mullah with fighting men. Forced marches westward to deal with Mullah's supporters.

100. The Allegiri, Arasama, Rer Haggar, and other tribes were surprised in various localities and severely punished. They were driven southwards into the dense thornbush of the Haud desert beyond Kurmis, and were kept on the run by detached columns. Punishment of tribes.

Over 14,000 camels, 1,000 cattle, and 30,000 sheep fell into our hands, and presently, owing to our holding the only watering places on the north of the Haud, the tribes came in and surrendered unconditionally.

101. These operations had involved forced marches by night and by day, of some 30 miles, through very dense bush, as much as 40 miles and over being frequently covered on days of actual conflict. Heavy marching.

The head-quarters alone had covered, from Beretableh, where the Mullah's pursuit was discontinued, to Kurmis, over 180 miles, and detached columns had, after that, steadily worked over an area of 1,600 square miles.

102. I tried whilst at Kurmis to communicate with the Abyssinian force operating on the western side of the Haud, but my scouts returned from Gerlogubi, and reported that the Abyssinians had gone south-westward to try to obtain food, and had then marched back to Harrar. Abyssinian co-operation.

I received a letter from the Abyssinian Commander by a roundabout way, asking for instructions, but it was too late to assist him, and many men died for want of food.

103. In the meantime the Mullah, who had succeeded in getting together his more fanatical followers* at Mudug, being threatened from the south by Sultan Yusif Ali, of Mullah returns to Beretableh.

* These men were called Derawēsh (Dervishes), and were under oath to fight for their religion.

Obbia, and finding his retreat to the Allegiri country blocked by my levies, came north again across the Haud to the neighbourhood of Beretableh in British territory.

Important to dislodge him.

104. As it was important to give him no time to re-establish his authority with the tribes, I decided to transport my force once more across the breadth of the Dolbahanta country and attack him.

Orders of recall impossible to comply with at once.

105. I received your orders of recall when I had come up with his rearguard, near Cour-Gerad. I was now over 340 miles from the coast, with no support nearer than Burao, 150 miles distant. To retire before an active enemy, through a country teeming with possible enemies, would have been very dangerous, and I had no option but to first proceed and break up the Mullah's force.

Arrival at Cour-Gerad on the 16th June.

106. We arrived at Cour-Gerad after an 18-mile march at sunset of the 16th instant, and scouts who had been sent ahead, having located the Mullah at Ferdiddin, some 14 miles eastward, I decided to continue my march the same night so as to attack him at dawn.

Zariba for stores formed at Cour-Gerad.

107. There was no moon, so, in order to enable us to get through the bush, only maxim, hospital, and water camels were taken forward, some sixteen animals all told. All the rest of the transport was left at Cour-Gerad in a strong zariba.

Column reduced to 700.

108. The column had been reduced owing to the necessity of detaching parties to escort captured animals and prisoners back to Burao, to about 700 rifles, 100 of whom had to be left to guard the transport at Cour-Gerad.

The mounted branch numbered only about 75 men, and there were in addition from 350 to 400 Dolbahanta tribal horsemen upon whom no reliance was to be placed.

March on Fardiddin, the 17th June.

109. We started at midnight preceded by scouts, and by dawn had descended into a shallow, bush covered valley.

Formation for attack.

110. Some prisoners were here captured. They reported the Mullah's villages to be just beyond a spur on the right of the valley, about 3 miles distant. The Mounted Corps was sent forward at a trot to reconnoitre and report. The formation of attack was as follows:—

The Head-quarter Escort (Camel Corps), in the centre, with Lieutenant Dickinson's company as a reserve; the 1st Corps under Captain Phillips on the right flank to crown the hills, and the 2nd Corps under Captain McNeill to keep on the left over the plain. All units were warned to keep well in touch of the centre, and not to be led into disorganized pursuit.

Reconnaissance by Mounted Corps.

111. The small Mounted Corps, some seventy-five men all told, under Major Beynon, under whom were Captain Friederichs and Lieutenant Walshe, soon rounded the spur some 2 miles ahead, followed by 350 tribal Dolbahanta horsemen, and the Head-quarter Camelry Escort was moved up as a link to connect with the column.

Heavy firing commenced almost immediately behind the spur and along the hills above, and the Dolbahanta horsemen at once galloped back.

Lieutenant Dickinson's company supports Mounted Corps.

112. Recognizing that the mounted branch must be more heavily engaged than I had intended, I directed the reserve company, under Lieutenant Dickinson, to get to the edge of the spur, whence a commanding fire could be brought to bear on the enemy in the plain, the rest of the troops to extend and follow quickly in the order I had previously intimated.

Work of Lieutenant Dickinson's company.

113. Lieutenant Dickinson's men doubled over the intervening 2 miles and seized the spur, suffering somewhat from the fire of the enemy on the commanding hills beyond. Assisted by the fire of the Head-quarter Escort, however, that portion of the enemy which was in the bush in the plains, and was then attacking Major Beynon's Mounted Corps, was checked, and the latter were able to fall back on the spur. A number of our men were killed and wounded, Lieutenant Dickinson being among the latter, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. Our Somalis, however, clung steadily to the spur, and even managed, of their own accord, to disentangle the Maxims from the dead camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.

Work of first corps.

114. The advance of Captain Phillips' corps over the hills on the right brought a considerable volume of fire to bear on the enemy in this direction, and the Dervishes were compelled to take cover and fire from behind boulders and bushes. Lieutenant Stigand's company, which was on the extreme right, presently outflanked the enemy and compelled him to retire. The Dervishes lost so heavily directly they left cover that the retirement became a rout, and they gave way all along the line.

Immediately the enemy's attention was taken up by the 1st Corps, Lieutenant Dickinson's men went forward, under a native officer, and, descending at a run down the further side of the spur, drove the enemy from the hills beyond.

Work of second corps under Captain McNeill.

115. In the meantime, the 2nd Corps, advancing steadily on the left, drove back

that portion of the enemy which had been engaged with the Mounted Corps, and, moving fast through the bush-covered plain, outflanked the enemy on the left. The enemy mounted their ponies and galloped into the bush, continually losing men by our rifle fire.

The pursuing force reached the Mullah's village and burnt it, and drove the enemy for 5 miles or so through the dense bush. The enemy tried here and there to stand but could not face our fire, and suffered considerable loss.

116. The Dolbahanta horsemen, on whom I had placed no reliance, took no further part in the fight, but galloped away to loot the Mullah's flocks and herds. Dolbahanta horsemen take no part in action.

117. Captain Friedrichs had been killed at the commencement of the action. He had been sent forward by Major Beynon with some of the Mounted Corps to act as an advance party, and, seeing the enemy on the hills some distance to his front, and concluding that the plain was clear of them, he had advanced into some very dense bush where an ambush had been laid. Immediately firing broke out, Major Beynon moved up, dismounted, in support; but nearly half his camels and ponies were almost immediately shot, and the enemy's riflemen, increasing in numbers at every moment, advanced, completely outflanking the Mounted Corps on both flanks. Death of Captain Friedrichs.

118. Major Beynon then directed a retirement. Owing to the loss of their mounts, the men could not get away without suffering loss in killed and wounded, and the loss would have been much heavier had not Lieutenant Dickinson's company and the 1st Corps just then checked the enemy, as previously described, by firing from the spur. Mounted corps fall back.

119. On the enemy's pursuit being continued, he fled south, across the Italian border, into the dense bush of the Haud, leaving dead and wounded everywhere, and scattering in all directions. Pursuit of enemy.

The pursuit having resulted in somewhat disorganizing, in the dense bush, the cohesion of our levies, Captain McNeill, who, owing to the easier ground over which he had advanced, had got ahead of the 1st Corps, decided to make a check, in order to reorganize. He was joined by a company of the 1st Corps, under Lieutenant Stigand, which had, by Captain Phillips' order, assisted in the pursuit, wheeling round from the right flank.

120. We were at this time nearly 50 miles distant from our last watering-place, and there was no water nearer than Beretableh. The water-tanks with Lieutenant Taylor at Cour-Gerad were nearly empty, and the men had used up the water they carried themselves. Only six camel-loads of water remained for the wounded men. The ponies and camels of the Mounted Corps had had no water since the evening before, and then only a limited quantity, and many ponies and camels had been killed or wounded by the enemy's rifle fire. The Dolbahanta horsemen, moreover, had been useless, and had cleared off. Reasons for abandoning the pursuit.

121. I therefore, with great regret, being also in some anxiety as to my wounded men, found myself compelled to abandon the pursuit, and so, after giving the men a few camels for their meal, we collected and buried the dead, and, having arranged for the carriage of the wounded, we returned the same evening (14 miles), arriving at nightfall at the zariba at Cour-Gerad. Return to Cour-Gerad.

122. The men had, from midnight on the 16th to midnight on the 17th, marched 40 miles, subsisting only on the water they carried, and had fought an action in dense bush and over stony hills. Work done by levies on the 17th June.

123. The Mullah's own kinsmen, the backbone of his following, had been very severely handled; over sixty dead bodies were counted on the ground and the pursuit came across many more; a large number of Sheiks and well-known men were amongst the dead. The Mullah's people never stayed their flight into the waterless desert for five days, and few reached the wells of Mudug and Bia-Aun alive, numbers dying of thirst by the way. The Mullah himself, his son, and his Chief Adviser, Haji Soudi,* were reduced to making use of the water found in the stomachs of dead camels. His chained prisoners escaped and his supporters scattered in all directions seeking their own safety. Dervish losses.

The Mullah's cattle and the camels of Haji Soudi were captured.

124. There being no water at Cour-Gerad we continued the march, at dawn of the 10th, down a steep ravine to the plain below, marching on a made road, possibly of Phœnician or Indian origin. We reached Eyl-Maado, our first watering place since Lasa Eyl-Birdale, some 80 miles back, at mid-day on the 18th. Here a halt of half a- March to Eyl-Maado wells, the 18th June.

* Haji Soudi is an ex-interpreter of the Royal Navy. He had been at Suakin, and was conversant with Dervish ways, and had imported many of their customs.

Sultan Nur is the disgraced Sultan of the Habr-Yunis-Ishak tribe, and is an outcast from his tribe.

day was made in order to fill water-tanks, and enable Lieutenant Boulton, I.M.S., to look after his wounded, and in order to reconnoitre Beretableh, where a detached portion of the Mullah's force, which had not taken part in the fight, was reported to be. The horsemen sent out by me, however, reported that these men had fled.

Beretableh to Eyl-Dab 130 miles, 19th to 24th June.

125. Marching some 20 to 25 miles a-day, we connected up with Lieutenant McNeill's advanced base at Tifafleh, and thence marched to Burao viâ Eyl-Dab, going through the site of Captain McNeill's zariba at Samala.

At Eyl-Dab the column was met on the morning of the 24th June by a party of the mounted branch, which had returned from Burao under Captains Merewether and Bruce.

Bad water.

126. There was no good drinking water for Europeans for some 150 miles or so, from Asura to Burao, but the Somalis managed to get water at Eyl-Dab, from which place they easily crossed the 95 miles to Burao on the water they themselves carried, supplemented by a few tanks. We carried water in tanks for the horses and captured live-stock, and by sending them on by night in small batches, managed to supplement the supply out of the almost dry wells at Olasar, 70 miles from Burao.

Transport of wounded.

127. The wounded were brought back some 340 miles to the coast on camels, or on stretchers carried by prisoners. Only one man died on the way.

Arrival at Burao, the 29th and 30th July.

128. The expedition returned to Burao on the 29th and 30th July, 1901.

Marching power of levies.

The levies had covered some 1,170 miles in three months, including delays at Burao, and had frequently marched 30 miles a-day. On days of action, as at Odogoi, on two occasions in the Arrasama country, at Kurmis, and on several occasions in the Allegiri country, and at Fardiddin, 40 miles had been covered, or over. Besides this, detached sections and companies had traversed an aggregate distance of 1,700 miles, and this does not include the work of parties of scouts and spies, who frequently worked two days ahead of the force.

Their equipment, &c.

129. The infantry carried, besides rifle, bayonet, equipment, and 100 rounds of ammunition, two days' rations of dried meat and dates, and a sheep-skin containing about a gallon of water. Blankets and superfluous clothes were left behind at Burao. Every British officer was mounted.

Behaviour in action.

130. Although the men in some cases were excited in action, they soon settled down to work, and on no occasion did the loss caused by the enemy's rifle fire affect them so as to cause them to hesitate in their advance. At Fardiddin the Somalis, of their own initiative, extricated the Maxims from the dead camels and worked them, paying proper attention to sights and trial shots. They took up new positions whenever the advance of the infantry rendered this desirable. In the same action, the Mounted Corps, which had suffered severely in men and animals, was ordered to temporarily fall back on the infantry, but advanced again with them directly a forward move was made.

The Somalis' good points.

131. No attempt had been made to teach the men, in the limited time available, anything except to generally obey orders, to shoot, and to learn the formations and movements necessary for general cohesion. They could march well, and being all more or less used to intertribal fighting, they quickly adapted themselves to our tactics. They understood the care and loading of transport animals, could live on meat alone, and could easily go for two days, subsisting only on the water they themselve carried.

I found no difficulty in at once finding as many riders as were necessary to utilize such ponies as we were able to buy or capture.

Some difficulty occurred at the start owing to there being no non-commissioned officers or training staff available, the men we eventually used for this purpose being merely coast policemen, some of whom had less than a year's service. The men learned fast, however, and directly non-commissioned officers began to come forward from amongst them, there was no further trouble.

Amenability to discipline.

132. It was not advisable, nor was it necessary, to dragoon the levies, whose mobility was, to a great extent, the outcome of their being an irregular corps. I had, whilst in the Uganda Rifles, some opportunity of contrasting Somalis with Soudanese, and I found the Somalis in the main perhaps easier to manage.

Discipline.

133. Provided the men are treated with the same consideration as is used in the native army in India, they will readily respond by doing their best. It was unfortunate that many of the officers could only communicate with their men through interpreters who, in some cases, were prone to make the most of their position.

The levies were placed under the Burmah Military Police Regulations and Somaliland Order in Council of 1899. There was very little crime, and the punishments, which it was found necessary to inflict in a few serious cases of plundering, having been very severe, a stop was at once put to anything of the kind.

Health.

134. The fever from which both British men and officers suffered, whilst in the low-

lying coast country, disappeared when once the force had left Burao, and the percentage of sickness was then very small. One or two officers suffered from the want of vegetables, but the men were not affected.

135. The total number of casualties inflicted on the enemy at McNeill's zariba and in the subsequent pursuit in the Arasama and the Allegiri country, and at Fardiddin, cannot have fallen far short of some 1,200 men killed and wounded. Some 800 prisoners, including many Chiefs and many Headmen, who were, for the most part, afterwards released, were also taken. Enemy's total losses.

136. The camels were either given as compensation to the Ishak tribes who had been looted by the Mullah, or were handed over to the men, with their consent, in lieu of pay, thus reducing the cost of the expedition. A large number of transport spearmen were paid entirely in camels, and wounded men, and the relatives of the dead were in the same manner compensated. Compensation was given for all tribal horses killed, and others were purchased from the tribes in exchange for camels. All casualties in the transport were made good, and friendly tribes were given a bonus for services rendered. The Field Force for some time lived entirely on its captures. Captures: how disposed of.

The sheep and milch goats, excepting a small percentage of the former, eaten by the force, were returned to the enemy's women and children. No person who applied for relief was turned away.

Thus, at the end of operations, our tribes had regained at least a good proportion of the losses previously sustained by them. All services had been paid for, and our transport and Mounted Corps had been put on a proper footing. In spite of nearly the whole of our horses having been killed, there were, owing to captures and exchanges in lieu of camels, more left at the end of operations than there were at the beginning.

137. In November the Mullah was still quiescent, and although he had received consignments of arms, he had not been able to collect more than some 500 men or so, his former followers having been much discouraged by their wanderings snd hardships in the waterless Haud. Latest news of Mullah.

138. For a year now he has made no attacks upon our tribes, although in the previous year when the regular troops were in the country, raids on the tribes, resulting in much bloodshed, had been frequent and had ended in alarming the whole country. Formation of levy has for a year prevented attacks on our tribes.

139. The most serious point is the continued importation of arms, and this must sooner or later cause trouble. Importation of arms serious.

140. The Abyssinian co-operation consisted, as arranged, in blocking the western side of the country. They never actually came in touch with the Mullah, nor were they seen by our levies. Abyssinian co-operation.

141. Major the Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy, who visited me at Adadleh, and there received my instructions had, with Captain Cobbold, his companion, a very difficult time with the Abyssinian force, continually requiring the exercise of tact and sound judgment. Major the Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy and Captain Cobbold.

142. Mekometers were badly wanted for the Maxims, but none were, unfortunately, available at Benly and Aden, and there was no time at the last to get them from England. The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been in the belts. Maxims.

Owing to the swaying pace of the camels and the rocking motion set up, the animals soon had sore sides.

143. Unfortunately, owing to the dust storms and haze which, during April, May, and June prevailed, signalling with 6-inch heliographs was out of the question. Possibly a larger size might have been useful, but none were quickly available. Signalling.

144. Gun-cotton for enlarging rocky wells, blue lights, and signal rockets were kindly supplied by General More-Molyneux, commanding at Aden. Blue lights, &c.

145. I had ordered from India three months' rations for the Punjabis. Further rations were arranged for by the Indian Commissariat at Aden. Punjabi rations.

146. The portion of the country over which the fighting took place was unmapped, except in the northern portion, by Major Welby's compass route, and as we did not march along this but crossed and recrossed it, we had to rely entirely upon native information. Unexplored country.

147. Our guides were fairly accurate in the northern part of the country, but got hopelessly adrift in the country where we got in touch of the Mullah, and we had consequently to do the best under the circumstances, and rely on capturing prisoners and getting information from them. Marches were set by compass bearing, and at night we marched by the stars. Guides and direction of march.

Medical staff.

148. Lieutenant Boulton, I.M.S., was assisted by two Indian hospital assistants.

Armourers.

149. Up to April the native armourers who happened to be available on the coast, attended to the rifles, but in April a British Armourer Sergeant was sent to me. A number of iron-workers had been enlisted and proved most useful in executing minor repairs.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somali Levy.

Commendations.

British Officers.

It now remains to bring forward the names of such officers and others, as, in my opinion, merit special commendation. As it was usual, after successful actions, for the expedition to be split up into detached columns, which pushed the pursuit of the enemy in every direction, the same officers were called on again and again to take independent charge of units.

Captain and Brevet-Major W. Beynon, D.S.O., I.S.C., raised and equipped a detachment of fifty Punjabi Mahommedans in India and brought them to the Somali Coast. He was appointed Second in Command, and was given the control of the Mounted Corps consisting of camelry and mounted infantry.

He had previously served under my orders in Somaliland, and the knowledge there acquired by him of the country and people, made him especially useful to me. He was in command of the levies sent out to capture the Jama Siad camels, and was with his corps during the pursuit of the Mullah, and afterwards on many detached pursuits. His loyal support, backed up by sound judgment, was of great help to me. I hope he will be rewarded.

Captain G. E. Phillips, R.E., is a thoroughly reliable and capable officer. Owing to his powers of organization his corps quickly reached a high state of efficiency, considering the short time available for training. He soon got influence over the men, who were ready at all times to respond to any call made upon their powers of endurance. A very good officer whom I confidently recommend for promotion.

Captain M. McNeill, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, commanded the 2nd Infantry Corps. He was in command of the zariba at Samali, the persistent attacks on which, directed by the Mullah in person, were successfully beaten off with such loss in killed and wounded to the enemy, as to thoroughly demoralize him. The position was one of great responsibility, and I do not think any officer could have done better. His coolness and judgment, on this occasion, gave confidence to his men, and thoroughly justified my confidence in him.

I desire especially to bring him to your notice.

Captain A. G. Sharp, East African Regiment, joined the expedition in time to take part in the march to, and action at, Fardiddin. On the death of Captain Friederichs, R.E., Captain Sharp was appointed Adjutant. I consider him a thoroughly capable officer, methodical, and understanding how to deal with natives. From the commencement he earned their liking and respect. He has already served the Foreign Office for four years in Nyasaland, East Africa, and Uganda, and has been mentioned in despatches. I hope he will now be rewarded.

Captain C. M. Bruce, R.F.A., commanded and raised the Camel Corps. His knowledge of mounted work proved most useful. He is active and tireless. He had trying work in escorting the undisciplined hired caravans from Berbera to Burao, but managed very well through hard work and patience. I hope he will be rewarded.

Captain D. A. Friederichs, R.E., was my Adjutant. He was untiring in his work, which was heavy. A very keen and clever officer, who lost his life in pluckily trying to save a wounded Somali non-commissioned officer. Had he lived I would have brought his services specially to your notice.

Lieutenant F. A. Dickinson, D.C.L.I., was appointed Quartermaster. He managed his company well, and was severely wounded when leading his men over a hill swept by the enemy's fire. He continued pluckily to move up and down the firing line, looking after his men for some time after he had been wounded, and his action contributed in a great measure to extricate the Mounted Corps from a difficult situation. I recommend him for the promotion he has well earned.

Lieutenant H. Boulton, I.M.S., had sole medical charge of an expedition, which at one time, if we include transport spearmen and others, consisted of 2,500 men. He was assisted by no other medical officer, and his work at Fardiddin, under fire, was heavy. He brought back the wounded some 340 miles to the coast, only losing one man. He is well deserving of reward.

Lieutenant H. Lamprey, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, defended an outlying corner in the camel zariba at the time of the Mullah's attacks on Captain McNeill's zariba at Somali. He only had a dozen men with him, and the fighting was hand to hand. Lieutenant Lamprey's gallant behaviour materially helped to beat off attacks, which were continued until some time after nightfall. This officer is well deserving of reward.

Native Officers, &c.

Ressaldar Musa Farah has served Government for some thirteen years. He is thoroughly trustworthy, and the most intelligent Somali I have met, and far above the average of Indian native officers. He has more influence in the country than any tribal Chief, and has frequently been employed on detached work, where his tact, judgment, and firmness have always insured satisfactory results. He is tireless in the saddle, and got the utmost out of the company of mounted infantry he commanded. He was conspicuously brought to my notice for gallantry in action at Fardiddin by the Officer Commanding the Mounted Corps. He is deserving in every way of suitable reward.

The following officers did very good work :—

British Officers.

Lieutenant H. du B. O'Neill, Bedfordshire Regiment.
Lieutenant H. F. Byrne, 2nd Battalion King's Central Africa Rifles.
Lieutenant H. Thorpe, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.
Lieutenant A. H. Dixon, West India Regiment.
Lieutenant C. H. Stigand, West Kent Regiment.

Native Officers, &c.

Subedar Suliman Khan, of the Coast Police.
Clerk Farah Omar.

Besides the officers who actually took part in the expedition, I would like to bring to your notice the names of two officers employed on a detached expedition which co-operated with my levies.

Major the Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy was deputed to accompany the Abyssinian force, and reported himself to me for instructions at Adadleh on the 29th March last.

He had a very responsible position, and both he and his companion, Captain R. Cobbold, were frequently in very difficult and dangerous situations, calling for the exercise of tact and sound judgment. I desire to bring the services of these officers to your special notice.

I would respectfully submit that, if the work done by the expedition under my command meet with your approval, the question of granting a medal and clasp and batta be taken into consideration.

I would beg to offer you my best thanks for your valuable assistance and advice, and to bring to your notice the thorough manner in which Mr. Cordeaux, His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Berbera, has at all times helped me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Commanding Somali Levy.

CASUALTIES.

	British Officers.	N.C.Os. and Men.
Deaths.		
Killed in action	1*	20†
Accidental deaths	1‡	..
Died from wounds	..	1
In action	..	1
Died from disease	..	1
Total	2	23
	25	
Wounded	1§	26
Total	1	26‖
	27	

TOTAL CASUALTIES.

Deaths	26
Wounded	26
Total	52

(Signed) E. J. E. SWAYNE, *Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Somali Levy.*

No. 17.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received December* 15)

(Telegraphic.) *Berbera, December* 15, 1901.

THE tribes in front of Burao are much alarmed as the Mullah is reported to be in force at Lasodar with advance posts of riflemen at Josawaina, Kirrit, Bohotele. I am taking all possible measures to reassure them. In view of possible developments the situation is less satisfactory though there is no immediate cause for anxiety.

No. 18.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received December* 21.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berbera, December* 21, 1901.

I HAVE just received news from Burao to following effect:—

The Mullah intends to make a simultaneous attack on the Ishak frontier, north and south of Burao, and has advanced suddenly to Oodwaina. He has a large following composed principally of mounted riflemen. The general situation is disquieting and will become serious unless we can move out and take the offensive, which is considered absolutely necessary. To do so is at present impossible owing to insufficient number of men and officers. May I expect additional officers? I am raising the levy to its former strength, and should the Mullah remain where he is, I propose to move out with all the cavalry to attack him. Burao is considered strong enough to resist an attack, and I have issued rifles to the frontier tribes, and am taking all possible measures to protect the frontier wherever it may be threatened.

* Captain Friedrichs, R.E. † Includes Akil Mahamad Magan.
‡ Lieutenant L. W. de Sausmarez, K.R.R.
§ Lieutenant Dickinson, severely. ‖ 1 since dead.

No. 19.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1901.

STEPS are being taken to send additional officers asked for in your telegram of the 21st instant. Be careful about taking offensive before they arrive.

No. 20.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1901.

MULLAH moving. Cordeaux wants officers. Could you resume command if wanted, and how soon?

No. 21.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Commissioner Sharpe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1901.

HOLD in readiness for active service two Sikh Maxim gun sections and 300 officers and men.

Troops may possibly be required in Somaliland owing to movements of Mullah.

No. 22.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 23, 1901.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a paraphrase of a telegram from the Officer administering the Somaliland Protectorate* reporting that the Mullah is threatening Burao, and asking for more officers.

Steps are being taken in this direction, but Lord Lansdowne would suggest that a man-of-war might be sent to Berbera to provide against eventualities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLEMENT Ll. HILL.

No. 23.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 24.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December* 24, 1901.

WITH reference to your letter of the 23rd instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 23rd instant, to the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station, together with his reply.

I am, &c.

(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

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* No. 18.

Inclosure 1 in No. 23.

Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Bosanquet.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, December* 23, 1901.

THE Mullah is reported to be agressive in Somaliland and has a large following. The Foreign Office have asked that a ship of war may be sent to Berbera to provide against eventualities. Can you arrange accordingly?

Inclosure 2 in No. 23.

Rear-Admiral Bosanquet to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Trincomali, December* 24, 1901.

"COSSACK" ordered to proceed immediately from Aden to Berbera.

No. 24.

*Foreign Office to Captain Cobbe.**

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 24, 1901.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that in consequence of a threatened attack by the Mullah, Muhammed Abdullah, on the friendly tribes and British outposts in the Somaliland Protectorate, he finds it necessary to dispatch six officers without delay to act with the native levies now in the Protectorate.

I am, therefore, to direct you to proceed on the 27th instant to Berbera, viâ Brindisi and Aden, and to report yourself to the Acting Consul-General, from whom you will receive instructions as to your further movements.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLEMENT Ll. HILL.

No. 25.

Commissioner Sharpe to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Zomba, December* 24, 1901.

REFERRING to your telegram of the 23rd instant, force you ask for is ready and can leave at any moment after transport reaches Chinde.

No. 26.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *December* 25, 1901.

I WILL return London 28th. Could sail in "Arcadia."

No. 27.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December* 27, 1901.

FIVE officers leave to-day; Swayne, Petrie, and medical officer on 3rd. What is present position?

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* Also to Captain Rattigan, Captain Osborne, Captain Barclay, and Lieutenant Fletcher, all officers of the King's African Rifles on leave in England.

No. 28.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berbera, December 27, 1901.*

THE Mullah has now retired to Eil Dab, but is threatening to resume the aggressive. He is reported to have with him a force of 12,000 men, most of whom are mounted, with about 1,000 rifles. The safety of Burao gives no cause for anxiety; its garrison has been raised to 650 men with one month's supplies. Further supplies for 1,000 men for one month are now in course of transit.

His Majesty's cruiser "Cossack" arrived yesterday, and I am taking precautions against a possible, though improbable, descent on Berbera.

No. 29.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received December 30.)

Sir, *Admiralty, December 30, 1901.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 29th December, from the Commander-in-chief on the East Indies Station, respecting the aggressive action of the Mullah in Somaliland.

I am, &c.
(Signed) EVAN MACGREGOR.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Rear-Admiral Bosanquet to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *Trincomalee, December 29, 1901.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from "Cossack" at Berbera, viâ Aden, 28th December:—

"Mullah raided to within 30 miles from Burao 16th December and then retired. He is now 70 miles south-east of Buroa with 12,000 men, mostly mounted, and 1,000 rifles. He is for the present quiet, but, according to native report, proposes to advance to the coast before the end of January. Burao is our fortified post about 90 miles from Berbera, garrisoned by about 500 native levies and 6 British officers. All available forces, Berbera 40 native levies, 170 police force."

No. 30.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, December 31, 1901.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 23rd December, 500 Martini carbines will be sent for the friendlies as soon as possible. Until Swayne arrives you should take no action beyond measures indispensable for the protection of friendly Ishak tribes.

No. 31.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 3.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berbera, January 3, 1902.*

THE situation is improving. The Mullah is back again at Lasodar, where he is distributing loot and resting his horses preparatory to a raid which he threatens to carry out on the Habr Yunis. I do not, however, anticipate further aggressions at present, in the face of our preparations to take the offensive.

I have requisitioned the services of 100 men of the Native Infantry from Aden under a British officer, to temporarily garrison Berbera and relieve the Somali Levy Company, which is required at Burao. The levies have been raised to 900 men, and I can complete the original strength immediately additional British officers arrive.

No. 32.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Sent by India Office through Resident, Aden, January 6, 1902.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram of 3rd instant.

Swayne due Aden 12th instant, and will concert military operations on arrival Berbera. Resident asked to delay dispatch of troops for present unless danger urgent. See my telegram of the 31st ultimo as to attitude meantime.

No. 33.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 10, 1902.)

My Lord, *Berbera. December 24, 1901.*

WITH reference to my telegram of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the news received from Burao of the Mullah's sudden advance to Odaweina has been confirmed by Habr Toljaala refugees who were present at the scene of the raid.

It seems that, on the morning of the 16th, a number of the Mullah's mounted riflemen suddenly appeared at Odaweina, where there was a large collection of "karias" (villages), principally Dolbahanta Berkhad and Habr Toljaala, and at once proceeded to shoot down the defenceless villagers, who were taken completely by surprise, and to loot all their property and live-stock. Shortly afterwards the Mullah arrived in person with a large following, principally Aligheri and Jama Siad. He at once announced that he had come to punish the Habr Toljaala and other Ishak tribes who had assisted the English; that the country was meant for the Somalis and not for the English, whose power was on the sea and at places near the sea; that he did not wish to punish those who followed him; but that he would certainly return and raid the Habr Yunis, who assisted the English, whom he would drive out of the country, and then rule over all the Somalis. He then ordered that all property belonging to Dolbahanta tribes should be returned, and, with the remainder, retired to Olasan.

There is little doubt that this sudden and unexpected raid was due to the treachery of certain sections of the Berkhad and Adan Madoba, who were living at the time with the Habr Toljaala.

As late as the 15th instant, one of our Camel Corps patrols, which had pushed out to Odaweina, reported having seen no signs of the enemy there or in the neighbourhood. They had, however, heard that, a few days previously, twelve Berkhad horsemen had come from the Mullah to try and persuade the rest of the tribe to join the Mullah, who had promised to return all the property which his people had recently looted from them. It is probable that the failure of their mission brought the Mullah down on them and the Habr Toljaala, with the result that the latter have lost all they possessed, and the Berkhad, with the exception of one section, have gone to swell the Mullah's already considerable following. The latter may possibly retire straight to Lasodar, where they can distribute their loot in safety, or they may advance again at once and attack either Burao itself, or, more probably, the frontier tribes north and south of that post. All possible precautions have been taken to meet either contingency. Burao is considered sufficiently strong to resist any attack; south of it, the frontier is occupied by the Habr Yunis, the majority of whom are, however, still far south in the Haud, near Darror, and the large waterless tract intervening between them and the Dolbahanta should render them immune from any sudden attack.

To protect those sections nearer Burao, I have selected some forty men of the Habr Yunis, under their own Akils, to whom Snider carbines and ammunition have been issued. These will form a nucleus around whom their tribal spearmen can rally should they be in danger of attack, in which case they have been told to send immediate word

to Burao, who will endeavour to reinforce them at any threatened point. A similar course has been adopted for the protection of the frontier north of Burao and the line of communications between that place and Berbera. The Shaikh post will be reinforced by moving into the block-house there a portion of the company detailed as a guard over the transport camels, which have now been moved up to Burao with the remainder of the company.

I have, in addition, established an advance post at Huguff, commanding the Muriyah Pass east of Shaikh, consisting of fourteen selected men of the Habr Toljaala, armed with Sniders, under their Headmen, and six sowars of the Coast Camel Corps. These will act as advanced scouts, and will work in conjunction with patrols, which will be sent out from Burao to watch the frontier between that point and Huguff. This will insure early information reaching both Berbera and Burao of any threatened advance on Shaikh or other point in the line of communications.

Though it is to be hoped that these measures will act as a temporary check on the movement, it is unlikely that they will bring about any permanent improvement in the situation, which, unless we are strong enough to take some offensive action, will become aggravated to a dangerous degree. The great extent of our Ishak frontier, the scattered and constantly shifting position of the frontier tribes, and the rapidity with which the Mullah is able to organize his raids, renders it sufficiently difficult to support the frontier tribes at any threatened point in the line, and without such support they will not be able to withstand a sudden onslaught, even with the assistance of the few rifles we can lend them. With the present strength and immobility of the Burao force any idea of striking a counter-blow at the Mullah's numerically superior and more mobile following is out of the question. I am, therefore, re-engaging from 300 to 350 men of the portion of the levy which was disbanded at the conclusion of the recent expedition. This addition should enable us to move out small bodies of infantry from Burao to support our Camelry and horsemen either in reinforcing any threatened point or in making a sudden dash on any isolated party of the enemy. Parties of friendlies, armed with spears and with a stiffening of riflemen, would be pushed out in advance acting as a screen of scouts and taking charge of any live-stock we may recover from the enemy. Any such offensive operations will be made with every possible precaution and only after the fullest information has been obtained. I have advised the Officer Commanding at Burao on no account to be drawn into a pursuit at such a distance from his base as would necessitate the interruption of his communications with Burao. Any small success we may gain in this way will be invaluable in steadying our frontier tribes and exercising a deterrent effect on the enemy. But any such effect will only be of a temporary nature. The Mullah may draw off for a time, but only to consolidate his forces and strengthen his hold over the Dolbahanta. His following is already estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000, which is no doubt increasing daily. It is difficult to say what number of rifles he possesses, but they can hardly number less than 600. He is making every endeavour to supplement these, and has recently, it is said, sent off 1,000 camels to the Mijjerten to purchase rifles and ammunition. Whether this is so or not, it is quite certain that as long as he is able to offer good prices he will always be able to replenish his stock of fire-arms. There is little probability of his retiring from the Dolbahanta, and though rumours are still current that he will move south to the Hawiya country, everything points to the contrary.

Under these circumstances, I would strongly urge the necessity of taking early measures to break up the Mullah's following before it assumes larger dimensions. To do so, we must raise the levy to its original strength, with its proper complement of British officers. The former I am already doing, but, until we have additional officers, we must confine ourselves to mainly defensive tactics and such offensive operations, on the lines already indicated, as may from time to time be considered necessary and capable of execution without incurring undue risk.

Owing to the persistency of native rumours that the Mullah will descend on Berbera before the end of Ramzan (23rd January), and the uneasiness and alarm which such rumours are apt to create amongst the native population, I propose to arrange for an early visit of His Majesty's ship "Cossack." It may also be necessary to have the loan of a company of the native regiment stationed in Aden, which will free the levy company at present quartered here under a British officer, both of which will be a valuable addition to the Burao garrison.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. E. S. CORDEAUX.

No. 34.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1902.

MEDICAL stores, two 7-pr. muzzle-loading guns, with ammunition, &c., and 500 Martini-Henry carbines, with 150,000 rounds ball cartridge dispatched to Berbera viâ Aden.

No. 35.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 18.)

[Viâ Aden.]

(Telegraphic.) *January* 18, 1902.

I CONSIDER that ships of war are no longer necessary. The "Cossack" returns to Aden the 19th January to await orders. She left yesterday to patrol coast east of Berbera.

It was too late to countermand the Indian troops when your telegram of the 6th January arrived, but now that the Mullah has withdrawn they will be returned immediately.

No. 36.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received January 20.)

My Lord, *Berbera, January* 3, 1902.

I HAVE the honour to report that, for the reasons noted in my last despatch of the 24th December, I have considered it advisable to have a certain number of trained troops at my disposal in Berbera. I have therefore requisitioned the services of 100 men of the native infantry regiment stationed in Aden, under the command of a British officer. This detachment arrived yesterday, and has relieved the Somali Levy company under Lieutenant Younghusband, who proceeds at once to Burao, where his services are required. I have also had in view the necessity of allaying the feeling of disquiet and alarm which the repeated rumours of the Mullah's designs on Berbera were beginning to arouse among the native population.

These preparations and the concentration of troops at Burao have had the desired effect in restoring in some measure the confidence of our tribes, and also in acting as a temporary check on the Mullah's aggressive attitude. Although he has now retired again to Lasodar, there are no signs of his following dispersing or of his own retirement to the Hawiya country. He continues to send threatening letters to the Habr Yunis, warning them that he will come and punish them before long if they persist in assisting us. His spies, who have been captured by our patrols from Burao, state that after dealing with the Habr Yunis he intends to move against the Ogaden; that until the hot season commences he fears no opposition, but anticipates that then the English force will again be put in motion against him. They also declare that he is still getting rifles and ammunition from the Southern Mijjertein and Hawiya country through Hamara and Barava, Italian ports on the Benadir Coast. This I consider to be unlikely, and it is more probable that the arms in question are some of those lost by the Abyssinian Field Force, numbers of which have, no doubt, found their way into the Hawiya country.

We have now some 975 trained levies at Burao with ample supplies, and only require additional British officers to enable us to take the offensive. When we once make a forward move, there is little likelihood of the Mullah holding his ground. He will probably adopt his former tactics and retire south-east into the Ogaden, where he will wait until the storm he has raised has blown over, and return again as soon as our forces are withdrawn. I would therefore recommend that in the event of his retirement before we can deal him a crushing blow, we should be prepared to temporarily occupy some central advanced post on our south-eastern frontier, such as Bohotele.

This would enable us to control the Aligheri, who, in spite of the punishment they but recently received at our hands, are mainly responsible for the present development, as, without their assistance, the Mullah could not have so easily and rapidly regained a footing in the Dolbahanta.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. E. S. CORDEAUX.

No. 37.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received February* 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Berbera, February* 15, 1902.

THE carbines and guns arrived last week. One of latter and all of former are up at the front.

I received the following news last night from Swayne at Burao:—

"Friendly Ishak tribes have been raided by Mullah at Amudleh, 20 miles south-west of Burao. Losses of friendlies believed to be heavy, though details of the extent of the raid have not yet been received."

I am summoning all the friendly tribes to assemble at Burao to assist, while Swayne is arranging for a counter-raid sufficiently strong to give no anxiety as to result.

No. 38.

Acting Consul-General Cordeaux to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received February* 22.)

[Viâ Aden.]

(Telegraphic.) *February* 21, 1902.

WITH reference to my preceding telegram, both Manning and Swayne consider that, in order to check the spread of fanaticism, a counter-stroke is now necessary. Latter informs me that situation may become dangerous, as great loss of life and property attended the Mullah's raid on the tribes round Burao.

No. 39.

General Manning to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received February* 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Aden, February* 21, 1902.

SWAYNE urgently requires 500 Martini-Enfield carbines or rifles (carbines preferred), 200 rounds per rifle, two 12-inch heliographs complete; also asks for Major Phillips to form a corps, also six more officers from King's African Rifles. I suggest three from 2nd battalion, two from 4th battalion, one from 5th battalion be temporarily attached to force. Six officers already attached proved most useful. Consider, therefore, in view of situation, only six officers accustomed to native African troops should be sent.

6th battalion requires artillery officer, replace Younghusband, and one more subaltern, suggest Stigand. Eight Indian signallers required; recommend five from 5th battalion and three from Indian contingent of British Central Africa be called for.

Swayne considers delay of dispatch of requirements possibly may be dangerous.

No. 40.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Acting Consul-General Cordeaux.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1902.

YOUR telegram of the 21st instant and Manning's of same date.

Have ordered to Berbera one subaltern, five signallers, 5th battalion; one Captain, two subalterns, reserve battalion; three signallers Indian contingent British Central Africa.

Will telegraph as to Manning's other requirements as soon as possible.

No. 41.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Sir C. Eliot.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1902.

FOLLOWING for Jackson:—

"Send at once Mombasa, for service against Mullah in Somaliland, one subaltern and five signallers from 5th battalion."

Forward officer and men as soon as possible to Aden. Telegraph name officer and date of embarkation.

No. 42.

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Commissioner Sharpe.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 24, 1902.

SEND at once to Aden, for service against Mullah in Somaliland, one Captain and two subalterns from reserve battalion, and three signallers from Indian contingent.

Report names officers, date embarkation, and probable arrival Aden.

No. 43.

Commissioner Sharpe to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received February 26.)

(Telegraphic.) *Zomba, February* 26, 1902.

YOUR telegram of 24th February.

The officers and signallers asked for by you, viz., Captain Morris, Lieutenants Bell and Bennett, and three Sikh signallers left here yesterday, 25th, to catch German steamer leaving Chinde 1st March and arriving Aden 20th March.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.

Major Hanbury-Tracy to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received May* 4.)

My Lord, *Harrar, April* 10, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I arrived here yesterday, the 9th instant, in company with Captain Cobbold.

The journey from Berbera was performed in thirteen days; considering the distance is 250 miles, I trust that you will be satisfied with the rate of marching maintained.

Between Berbera and Jig Jigga little water was procurable, and considerable transport had to be employed to carry a sufficient supply.

On my way from Berbera I visited Colonel Swayne at Adadleh, from whom I received instructions as to what he expected the Abyssinians to do in co-operating with him to catch the Mullah.

No difficulties were experienced on our arrival at Jig Jigga, where the Abyssinian post is situated—on the contrary, the Abyssinians did everything to expedite our arrival at Harrar by procuring transport, &c.

On our arrival here the Gerazmach (Sub-Governor), in the absence of Ras Makonnen, received us, and was most friendly.

King Menelek and Ras Makonnen were duly informed of our arrival, and the latter telephoned me to.day saying that he was communicating with King Menelek, and would let me know to-morrow the Emperor's wishes as to joining his army.

It is probable that Ras Makonnen will request me to join him at Colubbi (two days' march from here on the road to Addis Abbaba) in preference to my waiting his return. I shall then be able to explain to him Colonel Swayne's dispositions, and what he would like Ras Makonnen to instruct the General Commanding the Abyssinian army to do, in order to successfully co-operate with him against the Mullah.

The mail leaves to-day, so I am obliged to send this despatch previous to seeing Ras Makonnen, but I trust by next mail I shall be in a position to send you fuller information as to Ras Makonnen's final arrangements.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. HANBURY-TRACY, *Major,*
Royal Horse Guards.

No. 2.

Major Hanbury-Tracy to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received June* 11.)

My Lord, *Jig Jigga, May* 9, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to report that after a stay of three weeks at Harrar, I left that place on the 2nd May, arriving here on the 4th instant.

I regret that I was delayed so long at Harrar, but in the first instance, as I mentioned to you in a previous despatch, Ras Makonnen at the time of my arrival was absent, and did not return till the 20th instant.

Mr. Gerolimato arranged an interview for the day after his arrival, when it was explained to the Ras the reason of our being sent, which, of course, he knew, and impressed on him strongly the advisability of his granting us the necessary escort and facilities to join his forces under the Fitaurari Gabri, which had been holding the Gerlogubi district of the Ogaden, from which they had driven the Mullah.

It was most carefully explained at this interview, and also on subsequent occasions, to avoid his inferring that it was intended in any way to interfere with whatever dispositions his General might see fit to make—or that we proposed in any way to tender

him advice—what I gave him to understand was, that I hoped by being attached to the Abyssinian forces to be able to inform their Commander of Colonel Swayne's movements and to communicate to him any suggestions that officer might wish to make with a view to best insuring the effective co-operation of the two forces against the Mullah.

I found, however, that Ras Makonnen was little inclined to agree to our wishes to join his forces, who, he said, were worn out, and had suffered great privations, having been in the field since the end of last year. He added that on his side he had done his utmost to assist the British by expelling the Mullah from the district which had always been a favourite base for his depredations, and that the British on their side appeared to have done but little to co-operate with his General, the Fitaurari Gabri.

It was pointed out to him the difficulties that Colonel Swayne had had to contend with and the bad effect in our joint interests the withdrawal of the Abyssinian troops would now have, for the Mullah would then, no doubt, return to the Gerlogubi district and recommence his marauding expeditions.

We also gave him some information received concerning the state of unrest prevalent amongst the tribes on the Webbe, who, it is said, are ready to join the Mullah if he comes in that direction again. Makonnen had also, it seemed, heard of this and said he would take orders from Menelek on the subject.

I telegraphed to Colonel Harrington on the result of my interview, and asked him to arrange tho matter with the King, which I am glad to say he was able to do satisfactorily, for at my next interview with the Ras he expressed himself as ready to do his best to co-operate with the British forces, so as to finally and successfully close the career of the Mullah.

He gave me to understand that he would send at once a fresh force to replace Gabri's army in the Ogaden, and would furnish us with an escort of 500 men, which he thought was necessary to insure our safety on the way, the district being, in his opinion, unsafe for small parties.

The fresh force under the Kanyazmach Abanabro, to whom he introduced Captain Cobbold and myself, is to concentrate at Dagaha Mado, five days' march in a southerly direction from this place, and our escort was to await us there so that we could, if we thought it advisable in the event of the main body not being yet ready, push on in advance from that point for Gerlogubi.

The Ras asked me whether the Hospital Assistant who we had mentioned was being sent from India had yet arrived, and on our being obliged to own that he had not yet done so, expressed his disappointment, as he said his men had suffered greatly from fever and other causes whilst in the Ogaden.

I mentioned that Dr. Martin, who had been on a visit to Menelek, was now in Harrar, and was willing to accompany us; the Ras seemed particularly pleased at hearing this, doubtless from the fact that Dr. Martin is an Abyssinian by birth and acquainted with the language, and this will, I hope, be of great advantage to us and strengthen our position with the army.

I trust, therefore, that your Lordship will sanction his pay and allowances according to his rank and grading in the Burmah Civil Police.

The Ras placed his medical stores at our disposal, but beyond a vast quantity of cotton wool nothing else was obtainable.

I have arranged intercommunication with Colonel Swayne by means of mounted messengers, and although the distance from Burao to Gerlogubi viâ Hargeisa and Jig-Jigga, the only possible route is a great one, nearly approaching 450 miles, I anticipate that letters will not take longer than twelve days to reach me should no untoward event occur.

The Ras has sent with me the Chief of the district in which Dagaha Mado lies to assist us on our way, and to purchase at that place for us fifty camels; these camels are the property of the Government, and I am assured will be offered to me at a cheaper rate than could be purchased from the Somalis.

This Chief, Basha Ballina by name, is now here with me. He informs me that water will be extremely scarce at various points, and that a number of spare camels to carry water are essential.

I am to-day sending a letter to Colonel Swayne informing him of the departure of fresh Abyssinian troops, who should be at Gerlogubi in fourteen days, and asking him what he would like the Commander to do to assist him.

I consider it of great importance that I should be well posted with Colonel Swayne's movements—this would materially assist Colonel Swayne's operations.

I have no intention of allowing the Abyssinians to approach too close to our frontier, as it would be impossible to prevent looting, which would lead to complications. But it should be possible to occupy the water-holes on the possible line of retreat open to the Mullah across the Webbe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. HANBURY-TRACY, *Major*,
Royal Horse Guards.

No. 3.

Major Hanbury-Tracy to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received July 22.)

My Lord, *Gerlogubi, June 22, 1901.*

I NOW have the honour to forward a despatch giving some details of the operations of the Abyssinian expedition against the Mullah since the date of my last despatch from Jig Jigga on the 9th May.

My party proceeded southwards along the basin of the Tug Fafan as far as Eilker Gabro by the bed of the Fafan; here, in accordance with Ras Makonnen's wishes, I waited the arrival of the army.

The Abyssinian force, commanded by the Kanyazmach Abanabro, arrived on the 24th May, and consisted of some 10,000 troops drawn from the Harrar district.

I ascertained from the Kanyazmach that the Ras' instructions regarding our position with the force were that he should consult with us on all matters of importance relating to the operations against the Mullah, and that he should ascertain from us all available knowledge of Colonel Swayne's movements.

On the 31st May I received a letter from the latter stating that the Abyssinians would be rendering great assistance by preventing the Mullah from re-entering the Ogaden and also by punishing the Aligheri, a tribe living near the British frontier who were the Mullah's backbone.

I accordingly communicated the purport of the letter to the Kanyazmach, who promised to carry out Colonel Swayne's wishes in this as in any other matter.

The expedition having taken the field with only one month's provisions of flour, with no organized Commissariat of any kind and with no arrangement made by the Ras to forward a fresh supply from Harrar, the question of feeding the men had now become a serious consideration, and a consultation was held whether it would be better to proceed southwards to the Webbe, punish the tribes along the north bank of the river who had shown an inclination to join the Mullah, and who had refused to pay tribute to the Ras, and then, having collected all the grain available to make a sweep northwards towards Mudug in the eastern part of the Ogaden, which had long been a sanctum for the Mullah when pressed elsewhere. This plan would have involved a delay in pursuing the Mullah of some six weeks, and would have enabled him to utilize unchecked practically the whole of the Ogaden as a fresh recruiting ground.

The other alternative being to proceed direct to Gerlogubi and use that for a base further eastwards.

However, on the 7th a report, which seemed likely to have some truth in it, came in that the Mullah and his followers had been badly beaten by Colonel Swayne, and were now hiding in the country of the Makahil, which includes the tribes of Rer Ibrahim, Rer Ali, and Baggeri (the latter the Mullah's own tribe), who inhabit the country lying to the south-south-east and east of Gerlogubi within a radius of some 50 miles. The exact whereabouts of the Mullah was not known, but it was stated that he had sent his women and property to Hagari, a dense bush country east of Gerlogubi, and had summoned the Rer Ibrahim to his assistance. This, therefore, decided the Kanyazmach to move at once to Gerlogubi.

The Abyssinian force had by this time increased considerably in numbers since its start, various contingents joining from distant parts and a large number of volunteers, who had come without orders in hopes of plunder, and raised the force to some 14,000 men.

The difficulty that would arise in feeding this large number of men, the impossibility of carrying out any movement secretly and rapidly was evident, and it was therefore suggested to the Kanyazmach the advisability of splitting up the force into three parts and dispatching them against the three Makahil tribes who had persistently

supported the Mullah and many of whom were now with him and reconcentrating at a given point.

The Kanyazmach agreed to this suggestion and promised to carry it out when he arrived at Gerlogubi, which was reached on the 11th June. Here the Ba Awadleh scouts, who had been formed at our suggestion, brought in information that the Mullah was expected to arrive at Hagari, that he had fled southwards from Colonel Swayne, and that his women and property had already arrived at the above place.

The Kanyazmach, therefore, changed his plans, and taking the whole force, marched north-east some 50 miles in two days. On the morning of the 14th, no contrary reports being to hand and captured spies confirming our information, the Abyssinians' force, which had been formed in a semicircle round Hagari (a dense thick forest many miles in extent), was set loose and at once disappeared into the bush.

We ourselves followed with the Kanyazmach but could not proceed far, owing to the impenetrable nature of the jungle. The soldiers returned in parties the following day and some three days elapsed before the whole force found their way back to camp. The news, it turned out, had been untrue ; some of the Mullah's family, flocks and herds, had indeed been in the locality but had, on news of our arrival at Gerlogubi reaching them, removed with most of the tribesmen to Galadi, where the Mullah's brother lives.

The Rer Ibrahim were severely punished by the Abyssinians, who pursued them for three days in an easterly direction until they were compelled to return owing to want of water; some 200 Rer Ibrahim are reported to have been killed and some 20 Abyssinians missing. In one of the villages a certain amount of ammunition was found. Prisoners reported that the Mullah had fled to the Mijjertein, having been severely defeated by Colonel Swayne's force.

The loot captured in the raid was insufficient to last more than a few days, and by the 17th a great number of men were devoid of food.

The Kanyazmach now informed us that the position was very serious, as the live-stock captured was of little use to feed the large number of soldiers, and requesting us to advise him as to the best course to adopt to obtain more.

A large collection of the Makahil tribes being reported at Galadi, we suggested his marching there from Hagari, which could have been done in two days; his Chiefs, however, refused to carry out this idea.

He then said he would return some distance along the road to Gerlogubi and march to Wardair, where he expected to find cattle.

My information was that the wells at Wardair were deserted and this proved to be true ; however, the plan was carried out with the result that a long march of 25 miles over a heavy sandy country to Wardair on the 19th left the troops in a desperate condition. During the march they lost many animals ; men also were reported to have died of exhaustion.

The Kanyazmach now again came to us in great distress and besought us to tell him where food could be procured. We again told him that we had heard, and believed the iuformation to be correct, that half the Makahil tribes had collected at Bohr, a point some 25 miles south-east of Wardair and the other half at Galadi, and advising him to send a few hundred mounted men to both places, whilst the army remained at Wardair.

This plan he seemed to think well of and would have carried out, but his Chiefs refused to go and insisted on returning to Gerlogubi, where we arrived on the 21st.

Now that a week's provision of meat has been procured, the Kanyazmach has changed his plans, which were to return to the valley of the Fafan, collect grain and proceed along its course to the Webbe. He dare not return to Harrar without accomplishing something definite or bringing back much loot.

He now proposes to proceed direct to the Webbe from here to collect grain there and to march northwards to Mudug and the Mijjertein, the idea being that should the Mullah seek refuge there Colonel Swayne's force could not reach him owing to the waterless nature of the country to the north. However, this plan would involve three days' march without water, and the Kanyazmach has no means for carrying water for such a large force. We have pointed out to him the advisability of proceeding to the Tug Fafar. This he intends to do.

In the famished condition, which until to-day prevailed amongst the troops, they have been barely under control, and several occurrences of an unpleasant kind have occurred with the Somali soldiers of our escort, who have behaved with exemplary forbearance under circumstances of great provocation.

I have warned them repeatedly that it is useless to resist forcibly thefts of our live-

stock, and all this with the exception of a few milch camels I have handed over to the Kanyazmach for food.

The discomfort caused by the waterless nature of this country, and the great heat —the rainfall here not having yet commenced—added to the anxious time we have gone through, will, I trust, be made apparent to your Lordship; but I feel sure that until the Kanyazmach decides to return to Harrar you will consider my intention to remain with him, so long as he desired it and we can be of any assistance, or are likely to further the main object of the expedition, *i.e.*, the capture, or to break utterly the authority of the Mullah in the Ogaden, as correct, provided always the conduct of the troops renders our stay possible.

Before closing, I strongly wish to bring to your Lordship's notice the great assistance I am receiving from Captain Cobbold, late King's Royal Rifles. This officer, through his knowledge of Hindustani (understood by the majority of the Somalis of my caravan), has greatly helped me in dealing with these men, who, since the rough treatment they have been receiving at the hands of the Abyssinians, have to be treated with great care.

The good feeling which we have now established amongst the Kanyazmach and the Chiefs has been accomplished with some difficulty, as for some time it was apparent that they regarded our advice as tending to some political object, and it was only by the exercise of great patience, and by freely moving amongst them, that this was done, and also greatly due to his assistance and tact. It would have been an impossibility for me, unaided, to have been able to cope with the many difficulties we daily have to contend with.

As your Lordship is no doubt aware, this officer volunteered to accompany me without pay, although offered some appointment in South Africa, whence he had just returned, being mentioned by Lord Roberts for meritorious service in the field—for this was promoted Captain.

The hardships which the troops have had to go through has thrown a very great deal of hard work on Dr. Martin, whom I mentioned to you in my previous despatch as having kindly consented to accompany us, at Ras Makonnen's expressed wish, owing to the non-arrival of the hospftal assistant. He is daily besieged by numbers of patients, whose sufferings he does his best to alleviate, but owing to our scarcity of medical supplies, and absence of chloroform, he has been unable to perform surgical operations.

Being an Abyssinian by birth, and talking the language, his presence has been of great assistance to me, and I trust that this gentleman will be granted his pay and allowances according to his grading in the Burmah Medical Service.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. HANBURY-TRACY, *Major*,
Royal Horse Guards.

No. 4.

Major Hanbury-Tracy to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(*Received October* 9.)

(Extract.) *Feyambrio, September* 13, 1901.

MY last despatch, dated Gerlogubi, the 22nd June, informed you of the serious condition to which the Abyssinian troops were reduced owing to there being no existing Commissariat arrangements, and no means of obtaining food from the country passed through. This was due to the fact that Gabri's force had just previously devastated the country. Their state became critical within the following days.

On the 23rd June the Kanyazmach decided to try and collect live-stock from Bur and Galadi, two places situated south and east of Wardair.

Prisoners had told him that many flocks and herds might be expected. We had ourselves advised him, on the 19th, when at Wardair, to carry out this plan, but he had not taken our advice, and during the interval the tribesmen, hearing of the vicinity of the Abyssinians, had driven their herds further off, into waterless tracts.

This raid was unsuccessful, owing to the guides deserting, the unnecessary tiring of men and horses, and to no arrangements having been made for carrying water. The men experienced great suffering, and some lives were lost, and a great number of animals left behind.

During the Kanyazmach's absence we remained at Gerlogubi with the main body, and during this period a considerable quantity of live-stock was brought in, raided

from the Rer Ughaz, a friendly tribe, who have for some years paid tribute to the Ras.

This raid caused great dissatisfaction amongst the Ogaden, and on the Kanyazmach's return the latter returned the camels and the majority of the cattle, retaining only the sheep.

As it was impossible to stay longer at Gerlogubi, where the water is bad, and little or no grass available, the army returned to Faf on Tug Fafan on the 4th July, where both these necessities were abundant.

On arriving here, the Kanyazmach expressed his wish to march south to the Webbe, in order to obtain sufficient grain for his men to enable them to return to Harrar. He asked us our advice, which we could hardly give him, never having been there, and not knowing the resources of the country.

We were averse to going there ourselves, as we did not consider it necessary to accompany the force simply to obtain food and then return to Harrar.

We also considered it a very risky undertaking, the information of the guides being very unreliable, as they had not been there for a year, and since then Gabri, with his large force, had visited those parts and devastated the country.

The men were in a weakened condition, and had lost a number of their transport animals, and we were of opinion that it would be much better for them to return straight to Harrar with what food they had, and passing through a friendly and known country, than to go to the Webbe with the probability of finding on arriving there that food was unprocurable, and then being in a position of having no food to bring the army back, and dying of starvation.

We therefore recommended him to summon his Chiefs and consult them, and it was then decided to return to Harrar. This was a wise decision, as I have since heard that if they had gone they would have found no food.

We then started on our return journey. At Sassamani we decided to separate ourselves from the army, as it was imperative that the troops should return to Harrar by the quickest route, whilst we were obliged to go to Jig Jigga, which we had made our base for supplies, and where we had left the greater portion of our impedimenta. We accordingly returned to Jig Jigga, following the course of the River Jerer.

I reached Jig Jigga on the 14th, and here paid off the majority of the caravan.

Here I was delayed some days owing to the absence of Mr. Gerolimato (His Britannic Majesty's Consul) from Harrar, but we eventually arrived there on the 31st.

The officer in command of the troops in Ras Makonnen's absence met us some distance outside the town and received us in a most friendly manner.

It is improbable that the Mullah will obtain adherents in the Central Ogaden in the districts visited by the Abyssinians; he is utterly discredited, his cruelties and extortions having completely disillusioned tribes formerly following him and exposing his real character and object.

In the event of further trouble from the Mullah a scheme of active co-operation with the Abyssinians would seem difficult to carry out, but their presence in the neighbourhood of Gerlogubi has no doubt been of great use to Colonel Swayne, preventing the Mullah's return to his old quarters and enabling the British force to deal him a heavy blow.

The Ras left Harrar on the 7th for his house at Kombulcha, some four hours distant from Harrar, where he requested us to visit him on the 12th.

We accordingly left Harrar on the 12th, and spent the day with the Ras.

Before leaving he again thanked us in the presence of his Chiefs for our services with his troops, and handed us a letter on behalf of King Menelek couched in similar terms.

I hope to arrive at Berbera the end of this month, where the rest of my caravan will be paid off, and I expect to arrive in London about the 20th October.

No. 5.

Major Hanbury-Tracy to the Marquess of Lansdowne.—(Received November 29.)

(Extract.) 19, *Half Moon Street, November* 6, 1901.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a résumé of the work accomplished in connection with my employment with the forces of the Ras Makonnen recently operating against the Mad Mullah in the Ogaden, to accompany which force and to assist it, if possible, in co-operation with the Somali levy under Colonel Swayne, your Lordship appointed me in February last.

With this object I left England on the 8th March, accompanied by Captain R. P. Cobbold, who had been appointed to accompany me in an unpaid capacity. (Inclosure No. 2.)

The instructions which I received before leaving London were as shown in Inclosure No. 1.

I was directed to convey a present from His Majesty to the Emperor Menelek, which I placed in the hands of His Britannic Majesty's Consul in Harrar (Mr. J. Gerolimato), and this was subsequently presented by Colonel Harrington.

Leaving London on the 8th March, I proceeded to Aden by P. and O. steamer, arriving at the latter place on the 17th March.

On the 18th March I crossed to Berbera, where I spent some days with Colonel Sadler making preliminary arrangements as to the formation of my caravan, Colonel Sadler being of opinion that Berbera would be a better base to start from than Zeyla, provisions for the men at the latter being a difficulty. Acting on his advice I arranged to hire camels as far as Jig Jigga.

As it was impossible to foretell the duration of the operations, I made provision for a possible absence of nine months for myself and a two months' provision of rations for my caravan, it being arranged that a further supply of dates and "ghi" should be forwarded later on from Berbera to Jig Jigga, which place I intended to use as my advanced base.

As it was known that the country in which the Abyssinians were likely to operate contained but little water, a considerable number of camels were necessary to carry water-tanks.

My party consisted of one Headman, forty-six camels, twenty-three attendants, and an escort of twelve Somalis, besides my personal servants. The camels and also the servants engaged by Captain Cobbold are included in these numbers, and were no charge to Government.

Having completed the formation of the expedition, I returned to Aden to pick up my baggage, reaching Berbera again on the 27th.

The 28th was spent in making preparations for my start and receiving instructions from Colonel Sadler, the copy of which is annexed. (Inclosure No. 3.)

On the 29th I left Berbera, and directing Captain Cobbold to proceed with the caravan by the main road to Jig Jigga, I branched off to Adadleh where Colonel Swayne's Somali levy was situated at that time. I obtained from that officer a general idea of his proposed operations, for the information of Ras Makonnen and my own guidance, and then rejoined the caravan.

Jig Jigga was reached on the 8th April. Here I found the Fittaurari Banagusi, who is in charge of the district. Here I discharged the camels which had been hired to this point only, and leaving my baggage behind proceeded to Harrar, where the Acting Governor, in Ras Makonnen's absence, received me extremely well.

Mr. Gerolimato met me on the road before entering the town, and informed me that Ras Makonnen was absent at Colubbi, a country seat of his some 30 miles on the Addis Abbaba road, where he intended to spend Easter.

He returned a few days later and had an interview with me at once, when I found him averse to the idea of allowing Captain Cobbold and myself to join the army, under which the Fittaurari Gabri had now been in the field since the beginning of the year. He complained of the delay in the start of the British force, which, he said, had been promised should be in readiness to take the field simultaneously with the Abyssinians, whom, he alleged, were now worn out by fatigue and the privations they had undergone, and were not in a state to assist in further operations.

After several interviews I thought it best to ask Colonel Harrington to obtain an order from King Menelek allowing us to proceed, and this he kindly did, and the

Ras was ordered to send a fresh force to replace the army of Gabri, and to allow us to proceed with all dispatch.

A fresh body of troops was now collected to the number of 10,000 men, who were ordered to concentrate at Dagaha Mado, a place on the Ogaden border some distance south of Harrar, the command being given to the Kanyazmach Abanabro, who had served with Makonnen at the battle of Adowa, where he had distinguished himself.

The hospital assistant who had been ordered to join me from India not being forthcoming, and as I considered it imperative in the interest of the Abyssinians as well as in my own that a medical man should accompany the force, I asked Dr. Martin, who happened to have recently arrived from Addis Abbaba, to join the expedition. I considered that, being en Abyssinian by birth, his presence would be grateful to the force, and the Ras viewed the idea favourably.

Dr. Martin agreed to my proposal and joined me at Jig Jigga on the 9th May.

Ras Makonnen detailed Basha Ballina and his following as our escort, and he joined us at Jig Jigga and remained with me till my return to Harrar, serving me excellently well.

Whilst completing preparations for our departure from Jig Jigga to join the army we heard again that the Ras was endeavouring to delay the departure of the troops, and was anxious that we should not proceed until arrangements were further advanced. This, however, I disregarded.

I arranged by mounted runners a system of communication with Colonel Swayne's column before my departure from Jig Jigga on the 11th May, leaving all surplus baggage at this point.

I proceeded south towards Dagaha Mado, receiving on my way a letter from Colonel Swayne, who was anxious that a force might be detached to punish the Rer Ali, which tribe had been causing him some annoyance.

The Abyssinian army joined us at Dagaha Mado on the 25th May. It consisted of some 10,000 men, but it was impossible to obtain a correct estimate of their numbers, as the Kanyazmach himself had but a hazy notion of the number of men with him.

At Sassamini a letter was received from Colonel Swayne asking the Abyssinians to co-operate in punishing the Allegeri, but as information had reached us that the Mullah was retreating south from the Dolbahanta before the British column, I thought it better to lose no time in endeavouring to cut off his retreat by occupying the country around and to the east of Gerlogubi with all possible speed. The Kanyazmach concurred, promising to punish the Allegeri on the return journeys.

I already foresaw that difficulties must arise in feeding this large force, whose numbers had been swollen by the arrival of large numbers of volunteers aggregating some thousands.

A question on this point soon arose, for it transpired that whereas the army had brought with them a month's rations, the newly-arrived volunteers were quite unprovided for and had to be fed. A discussion then ensued as to the advisability of proceeding southwards to the Webbe in search of grain or of moving east on Gerlogubi; and as the Mullah was reported in the vicinity the latter course was decided on.

On arrival at Gerlogubi on the 12th June, the Mullah was reported in the thick bush some 50 miles east. It was, however, impossible to obtain reliable information. The country was denuded of any Ogaden who might have afforded information, these having fled in terror at the approach of the Abyssinians, who had no idea of any system of obtaining intelligence, and were also afraid to move about except in large bodies.

I urged the Kanyazmach to break up his huge force into three smaller columns to increase their mobility and render it easier to feed them, but he would not do so.

Accordingly, the whole army marched eastwards some 50 miles into the country of the Rer Ibrahim, where it was said the Mullah had sought shelter. The report as to the latter's whereabouts proved incorrect, but the Ibrahim who had been supporting him were severely punished, the Abyssinians pursuing them for two days in scattered parties and driving them into the hands of Colonel Swayne's advanced guard, who further completed their discomforture and captured some 2,000 camels. The Abyssinians killed some 200 of the tribe, and some hidden ammunition was unearthed and brought in.

The Mullah's brother and some of his family being reported at Galadi, the

position of which is shown on the map, and a large concentration of tribesmen being reported there with large quantities of sheep, I advised the Kanyasmach to send his main body and baggage to Gerlogubi and detach a strong column to Galadi and a second one to Bur, some 30 miles south of Wardair, where the Mekahil tribes had assembled, having been driven from the wells at Walwal and Wardair. He agreed to this plan which would, if it had been carried out at that time, have resulted in a blow being struck at the Makahil, one of the sub-sections of whom is the Bagari, the tribe of the Mullah—and would also have provided plenty of food for the troops—but afterwards changing his mind, led the army, already half starving, by a ciruitous route back to Gerlogubi.

We had warned the Kanyazmatch that it was essential for the men each to carry a skin of water, and had told him of the distances which we knew through some of our own men—whom we sent with him. No preparations for carrying water were made; the advice of our men was disregarded, and he has no one to thank for this misfortune but himself. He afterwards informed us that it was the will of God and must be accepted as such.

The Kanyazmach now gave orders for parties to scatter themselves all over the country, and the friendly tribes in the Fafan valley were looted, large quantities of cattle and sheep were forthcoming, and the crisis was, for the moment, averted.

The long course of camel meat diet, to which the Abyssinians are unaccustomed, now showed its effect, the men being in a weakened, disheartened, and sullen condition. Their horses and mules, owing to the scarcity of grass in this inhospitable country, had been greatly reduced in condition, and it was decided to return to the valley of the Fafan, where grass was abundant, and to there decide on the best steps to take.

Before leaving Gerlogubi, a letter was received from the Officer Commanding at Burao, in which was mentioned the report of the Mullah's capture, and as this was corroborated by prisoners and from other sources, we placed some reliance in it.

The Fafan was reached in the first week in July. The Kanyazmach now proposed to proceed south to the Webbe, stating that he was sure ample grain could be obtained there, and that when this was collected, he proposed to take the army back to Harrar, since they were unfit for further service, and internal dissensions with his Chiefs had arisen. I did not myself believe it likely that any grain would be obtainable in the Webbe. The country had been devastated by Gabri only a short time previously, and it was afterwards conclusively proved that I was correct in my supposition. It seemed to me that the Kanyazmach's plans courted disaster, for the men were worn out and in a bad state generally, and if no grain was found, it meant that none of them would return.

I, therefore, at a Council of Chiefs which was held, did my best to dissuade the Kanyazmach from this idea, and the Chiefs gave me a pretty general support. The spirit of the soldiery was unanimously against going further.

The Kanyazmach endeavoured to force the hand of his Chiefs by calling on the volunteers to follow him, but they, too, refused, and when he consented to return to Harrar, the Chiefs and the men appeared grateful to us for our refusal to countenance his scheme.

At this point we parted company, and returned slowly to Jig Jigga along the course of the Jerer. Our camels were in a bad state; all our ponies, excepting one, had died, and the men had had a hard time.

Mr. Gerolimato met us at Jig Jigga, and after a short halt there, where we reduced the strength of the party by dismissing all the men not absolutely required, we proceeded to Harrar.

The Ras was absent at Kombalcha, but the Acting Governor gave us a good reception in his absence.

On the following day the Ras arrived, and I had an interview with him, in which I gave him an account of the operations concluded.

He stated that the Chiefs and men had appreciated our presence with the force, and thanked us for having refused to agree to the Kanyazmach's scheme of proceeding further south when his force were in such a bad plight—which would have, he agreed with us, ended in a probable disaster.

I returned the Ras' visit to Kombulcha on our return journey to Jig Jigga, when he received us in a markedly friendly manner and presented us in Durbar, by the Emperor's command, with the Order of the Star of Ethiopia of the second class, and a letter thanking us for our services. (Inclosure No. 4.)

The Ras here placed in our charge a zebra, a gift from the Emperor Menelek, to

His Majesty, which, at King Menelek's request, we took with us to Aden and shipped in good condition on board the B. I. steam-ship "Manora," and he since safely arrived in London.

After leaving Kombulcha, we returned viâ Fuyambiro to Jig Jigga. At Fuyambiro, where the Kanyazmach has his head-quarters, a great reception was given us by the Chiefs and many of the soldiers who had composed the expeditionary force, who accompanied us as far as Jig Jigga, where they left us with many manifestations of good-will.

I feel sure that our association with the force has created a personal feeling of a most friendly nature with the Chiefs and soldiery.

From Jig Jagga we returned to Berbera.

On arrival at Berbera, the expedition closed with the paying off of the caravan.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Foreign Office to Major Hanbury-Tracy.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 25, 1901.

HIS Majesty's Government have had to consider the question of undertaking military operations against a certain Mullah, Mahomet-ben-Abdullah, who, having declared himself to be a Mahdi, has for some time harassed the southern borders of the British Protectorate in Somaliland, as well as the neighbouring Abyssinian districts. A levy of native troops is being raised and organized into a field force by Colonel Hayes Sadler, His Majesty's Consul-General at Berbera. It will be under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Swayne, and it is understood that it will receive in the proposed advance against the Mullah, the co-operation of an Abyssinian force which the Emperor Menelek is prepared to employ with the same object.

In order to facilitate such co-operation, it appears to His Majesty's Government expedient that a British officer should, with the sanction of the Emperor Menelek, accompany the Abyssinian force destined to act against the Mullah for the purpose of facilitating their concerted action with the movements of the British force under Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne.

The Marquess of Lansdowne has, with the approval of the Secretary of State for War, selected you for this duty. I am accordingly directed by his Lordship to request that you will start for Abyssinia with the least possible delay. His Majesty's Diplomatic Representative at the Court of the Emperor Menelek has been directed, by telegraph, to take such steps as may be necessary in order to enable you to carry out your mission. You will proceed to Zeyla, and, if necessary, to Berbera, before starting for the interior, in order to communicate with His Majesty's Consul-General, Colonel Hayes Sadler, and with Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne, from whom you will take your instructions as regards your military duties and whose wishes you will carry out, so far as circumstances will permit.

Your further movements will depend on the arrangements which will be made in direct consultation between Colonel Hayes Sadler and His Majesty's Agent in Abyssinia, who has been directed to obtain the necessary authority for your accompanying the Abyssinian forces.

Your military reports should be addressed to Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne for transmission home through His Majesty's Consul-General at Berbera, but duplicates should be sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington, whom you should also address direct in regard to any political questions touching Abyssinia.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington has been informed that you are charged with important despatches addressed to him, and has been requested to arrange for your being met with the view to their safe conveyance to him.

You will receive, whilst employed on this special service in Abyssinia, pay at the rate of 600*l.* a-year, inclusive of all allowances.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MARTIN GOSSELIN.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Foreign Office to Major Hanbury-Tracy.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 28, 1901.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to inform you that he has, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State for War, approved of Lieutenant R. Cobbold, of the reserve of officers, acting as your assistant whilst accompanying the Abyssinian force which is to co-operate with the British troops in Somaliland against the Mullah, Mahomet-ben-Abdullah. Mr. Cobbold has been informed that, for the period of being so employed, he will be granted the local rank of Captain in the army. It is presumed that he will be ready to start for Berbera with you on the 6th March.

It must be clearly understood that no expenses will fall to the charge of His Majesty's Government in connection with Mr. Cobbold's proceeding on this service.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLEMENT LI. HILL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Consul-General Sadler to Major Hanbury-Tracy.

Sir, *Berbera, March* 27, 1901.

AS soon as your caravan is ready you should proceed to Adadleh, where Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne will give you instructions regarding your military duties with the Abyssinian force operating in the Ogaden.

Arrangements have been made to supply you with a personal escort of two camel sowars and ten footmen.

In the event of the force to which you will be attached being in immediate proximity to our border you should, as far as you may be able, settle any differences which may arise between the Abyssinians and our tribes, referring any cases in which difficulty arises to Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington and myself. In this connection you should bear in mind that whilst our tribes are across the border they are, for the time, subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the country they are in.

In view of the relative positions of the two forces and the fact that our operations promise to be confined to the eastern portion of the Protectorate you will at present find it most difficult, if not impossible, to keep up direct communication with our expedition. You will doubtless consult Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne on this point. So far as can be seen at present you will probably find the most convenient way of keeping up communication by sending your reports to the Vice-Consul at Harrar, by whom they can be forwarded either by special messenger viâ Jig Jigga and Hargaisa, or by the ordinary postal route through Zeyla.

It is desirable that you should keep us informed of the progress of events in that part of the country in which you will be, and of the operations of the Abyssinian force, as frequently as opportunity offers, at least once in every two or three weeks.

I inclose letters of introduction to Ras Makonnen, the Governor of Harrar, and Mr. Gerolimato, our Vice-Consul at that place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. HAYES SADLER.

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Ras Makonnen to Major Hanbury-Tracy and Captain Cobbold, on behalf of the Emperor Menelek II.

(Traduction.)

DE la part de Ras Makonnen à mon auguste ami le Major l'Honorable Algernon Hanbury-Tracy et à mon ami le Capitaine Ralph Cobbold.

Comme nous allons nous séparer maintenant, et vous allez rentrer dans votre pays, je désire vous remercier au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Menelek II, Roi des Rois d'Éthiopie, pour l'assistance et les très bons services que vous avez bien voulu rendre à

mes troupes commandées par le Ganiasmach Abanabro pendant le temps que vous étiez avec l'expédition dans l'Ogaden contre le Mullah.

Le Ganiasmach et tous les officiers ont été très satisfaits, parce que vous avez toujours bien voulu les assister et les aider.

J'ai l'espoir que votre présence parmi mes troupes affirmira la bonne amitié qui existe déjà entre les deux Gouvernements de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Éthiopie.

Je vous envoie mes salutations.

Écrite à Harrar le 2 Pagounis, 1893 (7 Septembre, 1901).

(Cachet.) RAS MAKONNEN.

(Translation.)

FROM Ras Makonnen to my august friend, Major the Honourable Algernon Hanbury-Tracy, and to my friend, Captain Ralph Cobbold.

As we are now about to separate and you are going to return to your country I desire to thank you in the name of His Majesty the Emperor Menelek II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, for the help and the excellent services which you have been good enough to render to my troops, commanded by the Kanyazmach Abanabro, during the time when you accompanied the Ogaden expedition against the Mullah.

The Kanyazmach and all the officers have been very well satisfied, as you have always been good enough to help and assist them.

I hope that your presence among my troops will strengthen the friendship which already exists between the Governments of Great Britain and Ethiopia.

I send you my greeting.

Written at Harrar, the 2 Pagounis, 1893 (7th September, 1901).

(Seal.) RAS MAKONNEN.

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

Medical Report on the Abyssinian Expedition to the Ogaden against the Mad Mullah in 1901.

WITH the Abyssinian expedition to the Ogaden which was to co-operate with the British force against the Mad Mullah, two British officers, Major the Honourable A. Hanbury-Tracy and Captain R. P. Cobbold, were appointed to accompany, and with them a hospital assistant from India was directed to proceed, but as the hospital assistant could not arrive in time, I was requested by Major Tracy to take his (the hospital assistant's) place. I therefore left Harrar on the 8th May, and arrived in Jig Jigga on the 9th, where the Special Service Officers were waiting for me. Exactly three months after I gave over charge and returned to Harrar.

Medical equipment consisted of the "Congo" Medical Case (Burroughs and Wellcome's). List of the drugs and appliances it contained is attached. Besides these, Major Tracy made over to me some extra drugs, list of which is also attached. The Ras, with a view to assist, permitted me to go and take what I could find useful in one of his stores, but beyond a couple of small bundles of cotton wool I found nothing worth taking on the expedition. Few drugs and instruments I also took from my private stock. This medical equipment, although meagre, was, under the circumstances, fairly sufficient.

Strength of those who were primarily under my medical charge consisted of the two Special Service Officers, twelve Somali escort, twenty-four Somali camelmen, fourteen private servants (nine Somalis, four Abyssinians, and one Indian), five Somali syces, one Somali Headman, and one Abyssinian interpreter. But besides these our special escort of twenty Abyssinian soldiers under an officer, an Arab officer with a following of about twenty men; and the sick from the Abyssinian expeditionary force, about 15,000 strong, also received medical aid as far as possible. Some cases from the Somali villages on our march were also treated. The army found us on the 25th May and left us on its way back to Harrar on the 15th July.

During the period that I was attached to the expedition 494 cases were treated by me, out of which 104 belonged to our establishment, 29 were villagers, and the rest, 361, belonged to the Abyssinian army. Out of the total the Somalis numbered 130, Abyssinians, 360; and other classes, 4. Largest number of cases—184—were those of

ulcers and abscesses, including two cases of erysipelas. Cases of bowel complaints, principally diarrhœa and dysentery, amounted to 122. Cases of fever numbered 103, injuries, accidental 23, and results of rows and quarrelling, &c., 18, and eye cases, 25. The balance—19 cases—consisted of: ear affections, 3; throat affections, 4; skin diseases, 2; caries of teeth, 6, &c.

Minor operations performed numbered 53. These consisted of 47 incisions of abscesses, 1 enlargement of gunshot wound, and 5 extraction of teeth.

The only case of gunshot wound that occurred was an accidental one. Two Abyssinian soldiers captured twelve Somali prisoners of the Ibrahim tribe. While on their way to the camp one of the soldiers went some distance away from the rest. The prisoners, finding themselves in charge of a single man, overpowered him and escaped. While the struggle was going on the absent soldier hearing the cries for help fired from a distance, but instead of hitting the prisoners, as he meant to do, shot his own comrade just above the hip bone, the bullet passing through the abdomen from side to side. About twenty hours after the accident the patient was brought to me in a collapsed condition. In the absence of chloroform and assistance the little that could be done for the man was done, but the patient died a few hours after.

Ulcers and abscesses were principally caused by thorns and accidental injuries, legs and feet of the Abyssinians being quite unprotected and bare. Somalis, however, wear a sort of sandals which afford a certain amount of protection to their feet.

Fever and bowel complaints became rife on our arrival at Baligadud, a place about 40 miles east-north-east of Gerlogubi. Water supply was abundant about here, there being over a dozen large "jhils" or swamps within an area of about 20 miles. But the water of these swamps was very impure, being the rain washings of the surrounding country mixed with a large proportion of animal urine and excreta. Add to this the semi-starved and exhausted condition of the army and the cause of these complaints will be evident. Wonder is the soldiers did not suffer more than they did. I may mention that although there was a good deal of fever of the malarial type there were no mosquitoes to account for it.

In connection with a bad case of jaundice which came under treatment, perhaps it will be interesting to point out that the Abyssinians call the complaint "wof" (which means, literally, a bird) and ascribe the complaint to the hovering of some sort of mythical night-bird over a man's head. The treatment for the malady is supposed to be the flesh of the same imaginary bird when obtainable. Anæmia called "mich" or stroke, is ascribed to the effect of the sun, while eating in the sunshine, or to the evil eye. Some sort of herb is said to be the treatment for it, but I have not been able to get the name of or the herb itself yet.

Fever is called "waba" or plague, and being a rare complaint in Abyssinia is looked upon as a very serious disease. There is no native treatment for it, but the virtue of quinine is getting to be known by the more intelligent section of the population. Mortality amounted to four from disease and one from gunshot wound. One of the deceased was a woman and four were males. Amongst those who died from sickness was one old "Girazmach" or General of the left wing. This officer was not in good health when he formed the expedition and three days after the force joined us he was taken ill with persistent hiccups, which appeared to be due to pure neurosis. Couple of days after the attack he asked for treatment, under which he recovered from hiccups but was taken ill with malarial fever. Being in a weak condition and unable to do the forced marches we were obliged to do, it was considered advisable to leave him behind in a village with some attendants. About four weeks after the news of his death was received. The remaining three cases of death from disease had not been under my treatment. The case of gunshot wound has been described above.

There was no death in our own establishment.

When hardships and privations the soldiers underwent is taken into consideration, it appears quite wonderful that there were so few cases of illness and so few deaths, and is, I think, a strong proof of their physical endurance and hardness. Majority of the soldiers were men between 20 and 30 years of age, but there was a very fair sprinkling of old men and mere youths. Generally speaking an Abyssinian is under the middle height and spare in build, and does not seem capable of standing much hardship and privation, yet his training in fasting twice a-week and half the year besides seems to fit him to bear fatigue and starvation wonderfully well. But, on the other hand, the unrestricted indulgence in "tej" (mead) and "talla" (beer) renders him such a thirsty subject that he succumbs under thirst in a few hours.

There is no doubt that the Abyssinians for lack of medical arrangements of their own were very grateful for the medical and surgical aid they received through the

benevolence of the British Government. The officers of the force of the Ras himself were quite pleased and gratified at this proof of friendship and goodwill and were very thankful for it.

(Signed) C. MARTIN, *D.R.C.P., S.Ed.*,
Medical Officer attached to the Expedition.

Harrar, September 6, 1901.

No. 6.

Foreign Office to Major Hanbury-Tracy.

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 10, 1901.

I AM directed by the Marquess of Lansdowne to express to you and to Captain Cobbold his thanks for the interesting Report on the recent Anglo-Abyssinian expedition against the Mullah Mahomet Abdullah which you left at this Office on the 29th ultimo.

I am to take this opportunity of conveying to you Lord Lansdowne's appreciation of your services in connection with those operations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLEMENT Ll. HILL.

AFRICA. No. 3 (1902).

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Rising of the Mullah Muhammed Abdullah in Somaliland and consequent Military Operations, 1901–1902.

[In continuation of "Africa No. 5 (1901)."]

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty. March 1902.

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RELATING TO THE

UGANDA RAILWAY.

1902.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.
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